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Demystifying Patent Holdup
Thomas F. Cotter†
Erik Hovenkamp‡
Norman Siebrasse
Abstract
Patent holdup can arise when circumstances enable a patent
owner to extract a larger royalty ex post than it could have obtained
in an arms length transaction ex ante. While the concept of patent
holdup is familiar to scholars and practitioners—particularly in
the context of standard-essential patent (SEP) disputes—the
economic details are frequently misunderstood. For example, the
popular assumption that switching costs (those required to switch
from the infringing technology to an alternative) necessarily
contribute to holdup is false in general, and will tend to overstate
the potential for extracting excessive royalties. On the other hand,
some commentaries mistakenly presume that large fixed costs are
an essential ingredient of patent holdup, which understates the
scope of the problem.
In this Article, we clarify and distinguish the most basic
economic factors that contribute to patent holdup. This casts light
on various points of confusion arising in many commentaries on the
subject. Path dependence—which can act to inflate the value of a
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technology simply because it was adopted first—is a useful concept
for understanding the problem. In particular, patent holdup can be
viewed as opportunistic exploitation of path dependence effects
serving to inflate the value of a patented technology (relative to the
alternatives) after it is adopted. This clarifies that factors
contributing to holdup are not static, but rather consist in changes
in economic circumstances over time. By breaking down the
problem into its most basic parts, our analysis provides a useful
blueprint for applying patent holdup theory in complex cases.
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I. Introduction
For more than ten years now, patent infringement litigation
filed by owners of standard-essential patents (SEPs)1 and by
patent assertion entities (PAEs)2 has caused courts and other
decision makers throughout the world to reconsider the
conventional practice of awarding the prevailing patent owner a
permanent injunction (as opposed to an ongoing royalty for
prospective infringing sales). In the United States, for example, the
Supreme Court in its 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C.3 rejected the long-held view that patent owners are entitled
to injunctions almost as a matter of right, and ruled instead that
courts should consider four factors (irreparable harm, inadequacy
of legal remedies, the balance of hardships, and the public interest)
to determine whether injunctive relief is appropriate.4
As a result, U.S. courts today rarely award injunctions to SEP
owners and PAEs.5 Meanwhile, courts in other countries have also
made it more difficult for SEP owners to obtain injunctions,
1. SEPs are patents that:
read on aspects of technical standards, like the wireless
communications standards that are adopted by standard setting
organizations (SSOs) such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE), the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI). Often these organizations require their members to disclose
any patents they own that read on any aspect of a standard that the
organization is considering or has adopted, and to commit to licensing
those patents to third parties on fair, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms.
THOMAS F. COTTER, PATENT WARS: HOW PATENTS IMPACT OUR DAILY LIVES 230
(2018).
2. PAEs, sometimes referred to pejoratively as “patent trolls,” are entities
that “acquire patents from third parties and seek to generate revenue by asserting
them against alleged infringers” which “already use . . . the patented technology.”
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY 1 (2016)
[hereinafter FTC STUDY], https://perma.cc/YK9Q-TU8V (PDF).
3. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
4. Id. at 391–92.
5. For a survey of the relevant empirical studies and case law, see Thomas
F. Cotter & John M. Golden, Empirical Studies Relating to Patents—Remedies, in
2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 390,
398–403 (Peter Menell et al. eds., 2019).
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although the standards used to decide whether an injunction is
warranted in an SEP case—grounded variously in antitrust law,
contract law, the law of patent remedies, or the civil law doctrine
of abuse of right—are hardly uniform.6 Moreover, courts outside
the United States, for the most part, have continued routinely
granting injunctions in other patent disputes;7 a practice that
leads some observers to worry that, just when trolling behavior has
started to decline in the United States, countries such as Germany
and China (or possibly Europe’s soon-to-be-up-and-running
Unified Patent Court) will become troll magnets.8
On the other side of the coin, some analysts argue that the
perceived abuses that have convinced U.S. authorities to deny
injunctions in certain types of cases are a myth, and that it’s U.S.
practice that has taken a wrong turn post-eBay. Just this past
year, for example, the newly appointed head of the U.S.
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division has made a series of
speeches critiquing courts’ reluctance to grant injunctions in SEP

6. For discussion of the foreign case law, see Jorge L. Contreras et al., The
Effect of FRAND Commitments on Patent Remedies, in PATENT REMEDIES AND
COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARDS A GLOBAL CONSENSUS 160, 175–201 (Jorge
Contreras et al. eds., 2019) [hereinafter COMPLEX PRODUCTS].
7. See Norman V. Siebrasse et al., Injunctive Relief, in COMPLEX PRODUCTS,
supra note 6, at 115, 141 (“As a broad generalization, countries with civil law
systems tend to award injunctive relief to a prevailing patentee routinely, and in
some countries, effectively as a matter of right . . . .”).
8. See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 INNOVATE, SUPPORTING INNOVATION
IN EUROPE THROUGH A BALANCED PATENT SYSTEM: A PAPER RESPONDING TO THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S IP PACKAGE 8 (2018), https://perma.cc/6MAX-7F5N
(PDF):
[T]he ability to threaten to demand an automatic injunction . . . is a
weapon leveraged by PAEs even though their true goal is to receive
payment, not block products from the market. That weapon will
become all the more powerful when the UPC [Unified Patent Court]
begins operations and an injunction across all Member States is
possible.
See also Kaya Elkiner & Kyla Payne, Patent Infringement Claims in China, LAW
SOC’Y GAZETTE (Dec. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/V4JF-PHMK (last visited Nov. 3,
2019) (noting that the availability of permanent injunctions could result in an
increase in patent litigation by non-practicing entities in China) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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cases,9 and legislation has been introduced in Congress that, if
enacted, would overturn the eBay decision.10
These differing views over whether, or when, courts should
award injunctions in patent disputes often reflect the speaker’s
understanding of the frequency with which patent owners engage
in a practice referred to as “patent holdup.” To see why, consider
the fact that SEP owners, PAEs, and many other patent owners
often are uninterested in using their patent rights to exclude
infringers from the market; they are, instead, willing to license
these rights for the right price, and a credible threat of obtaining
an injunction enhances the owner’s ability to negotiate a favorable
deal.
Given this reality, many economists and legal scholars have
argued that patent owners who can threaten to “hold up” infringers
by obtaining injunctions can compel the latter to pay excessive
royalties—that is, royalties in excess of what the infringer would
have agreed to pay for a license in an arm’s length negotiation—in
order to avoid abandoning the infringing technology and switching
to a noninfringing alternative.11 In reaching this conclusion, these
9. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Keynote Address at the LeadershIP Conference on IP, Antitrust, and
Innovation Policy: The Long Run: Maximizing Innovation Incentives Through
Advocacy and Enforcement, (Apr. 10, 2018); Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney
Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Keynote Address at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School: The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and
Intellectual Property Law (Mar. 16, 2018); Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney
Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at USC Gould School of
Law—Application of Competition Policy to Technology and IP Licensing: Take It
to the Limit: Respecting Innovation Incentives in the Application of Antitrust
Law (Nov. 10, 2017).
10. See STRONGER Patents Act of 2018, H.R. 5340, 115th Cong. § 106
(2018) (proposing to amend 35 U.S.C. § 283 to state that “[u]pon a finding by a
court of infringement of a patent not proven invalid or unenforceable, the court
shall presume that (1) further infringement of the patent would cause irreparable
injury; and (2) remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that
injury,” effectively overruling eBay); STRONGER Patents Act of 2017, S. 1390,
115th Cong. § 106 (2017) (same); Restoring America’s Leadership in Innovation
Act of 2018, H.R. 6264, 115th Cong. § 12 (2018) (similar); Inventor Protection Act,
H.R. 6557, 115th Cong. § 3 (2018) (proposing amendments similar to H.R. 6264,
but applicable only to “inventor-owned patents”).
11. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING
PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 225–35 (2011) [hereinafter FTC
REPORT], https://perma.cc/Y9SL-HE5C (PDF) (assessing the extent to which
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observers have drawn upon a body of economic literature
describing what we will refer to as “classic” holdup, in which one
party to an existing contract extracts ex post concessions from the
other by taking advantage of the latter’s investment in
transaction-specific investments that cannot readily be deployed
for other purposes.12 If left unchecked, the possibility that such
conduct may occur can reduce social welfare by discouraging
parties, ex ante, from entering into what otherwise could have been
mutually advantageous transactions.13
injunctive relief may give rise to holdup); Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup,
Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1179–80 (2009)
(same); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2035–39 (2007) (same); Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up,
and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 280, 302 (2010) (same); see also infra
Part II.C.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 43–68 (1985) (discussing
the various economic approaches and behavioral assumptions employed by the
“contractual man” when assessing contracts); Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and
Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426, 439 (1976) (detailing “the
customers’ demand for protection of the right to be served”); Benjamin Klein et
al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297 (1978) (discussing “one particular cost of using the
market system—the possibility of post-contractual opportunistic behavior”);
Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 752 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987); Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups
Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY
444 (1996); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market
Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112 (1971). This work in turn built on
concepts pioneered by Ronald Coase. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937). Of course, it has long been observed that someone looking
to develop real property owned by multiple separate entities faces a risk that the
last owner to agree to terms will “hold out” for a price far in excess of the
proportionate value of her plot. Economic analysis of the efficiency consequences
of holdout paralleled the development of the holdup literature noted above. See,
e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–10 (1972)
(discussing eminent domain); Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL
STUD. 351 (1991) (distinguishing between the concepts of “hold out” and “free
rider”); Errol E. Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent Domain: History and
Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1, 49–50 n. 175 (1980), citing Patricia Munch, An Economic
Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473 (1976)). Patent law
commentators sometimes cite this literature on real estate holdout when
discussing the concept of “royalty stacking,” which is said to occur when multiple
patent owners, acting in their individual self-interest, demand royalties that in
the aggregate exceed the social optimum. Cotter, supra note 11, at 1163, 1165
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Extending this analysis to the patent context, once a
manufacturer has committed to using a technology that it
discovers, after the fact, is patented, a patent owner armed with
an injunction can extract a royalty that reflects not only the
technology’s economic value—that is, its ex ante value in
comparison with the next-best available nonpatented
alternative14—but also some excess above and beyond this,
variously described as consisting of the manufacturer’s “sunk”
costs of adopting the technology15 and/or the “switching costs” the
manufacturer would incur if, ex post, it were to abandon the
infringing technology and adopt the next-best alternative.16
Further, if and when patent holdup occurs, it threatens harm not
only to short-term (static) efficiency, analogous to the harm caused
by classic holdup, but also to the long-term (dynamic) efficiency
that the patent system is intended to promote.17
Concern about the impact of holdup has been a driving factor
behind the aforementioned shift away from granting permanent
injunctions in the United States18 and, to a more limited degree,
elsewhere.19 But if courts are going to withhold injunctions on
account of holdup risks, it is crucial that they understand what
holdup is, and what sort of evidence would be consistent with a
n.71. For present purposes, however, we will focus on the economic literature as
developed by Williamson and others to address opportunistic behavior in the
context of incomplete contracts, since this seems to have the most relevance to
the various forms of conduct that have been described as patent holdup.
14. For discussion of the relevant literature, see infra note 45 and
accompanying text.
15. For the sake of brevity, we will use the term “sunk costs” to refer to the
costs the infringer has incurred that are specific to implementing the infringing
technology, and cannot be salvaged or redeployed for other purposes. Assets that
could be salvaged or redeployed (e.g., for use in implementing the noninfringing
alternative) would not factor into our definition of a holdup royalty. See infra
notes 30–31 and accompanying text (discussing work by Klein et al.); notes 96– 99
and accompanying text (presenting our model).
16. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
18. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text (describing the decline in
issuing permanent injunctions within the United States).
19. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (referring to relevant foreign
case law).
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serious holdup risk in a particular case; but this is often easier said
than done, in part due to the literature’s ambiguous or inconsistent
usage of the term “switching costs.” In the general economics
literature, a switching cost is said to be “created whenever the
consumer makes an investment specific to his current seller that
must be duplicated for any new seller.”20
Applied to the present context, this definition would include
as a switching cost the manufacturer’s loss of the ability to recoup
the sunk costs of adopting the infringing technology.21 The patent
owner’s ability to extract some portion of it ex post is a source of
holdup, albeit one that is not distinct from sunk costs. Perhaps as
a result, in the context of patent holdup, observers sometimes use
the terms “sunk costs” and “switching costs” almost
interchangeably.22 Other statements, by contrast, appear to
distinguish switching from sunk costs by describing the former as
including “costs of redesign, investments in additional plant or
equipment, any difference in incremental production costs, and
any difference in consumers’ willingness to pay for the product”23
(i.e., future costs that would be incurred to adopt an alternative
technology) as distinct from the sunk (past) costs of adopting the
20.

See Paul Klemperer, Switching Costs, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
infra note 29, at 13385 (defining switching costs); see also Joseph
Farrell & Paul D. Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with
Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 1967, 1977 (Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter eds. 2007) (same).
This effect would constitute holdup, however, only if it is not anticipated ex ante.
To the extent it is anticipated, prices would go up, but they would do so in ex ante
contracts, not through opportunism.
21. Viewing this inability to recoup the sunk costs as a loss is not an example
of the sunk cost fallacy. Irrecoverable sunk costs are irrelevant to the profitability
of an enterprise going forward, but in the present context it is the ability to
recover the sunk costs through product sales that the manufacturer forgoes if it
abandons the infringing technology. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Trolls and Orphans, 96
B.U. L. REV. 691, 695 n.10 (2016); Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents,
and Hold-up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 612–13 & nn.35, 37 (2007).
22. See FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 191 (“The ability of patentees to
demand and obtain royalty payments based on the switching costs faced by
accused infringers, rather than the ex ante value of the patented technology
compared to alternatives, is commonly called ‘hold-up.’”); id. at 191 n.61
(“‘Hold-up’ is used throughout this report to describe a patentee’s ability to extract
a higher licensing fee after an accused infringer has sunk costs into implementing
the patented technology than the patentee could have obtained at the time of
design decisions, when the patented technology competed with alternatives”).
23. Id. at 190 n.53.
OF ECONOMICS,
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infringing technology.24 Moreover, in asserting that switching
costs can contribute to holdup, some commentaries might be read
as taking the position that redesign and other associated ex post
costs, as such, are a distinct source of patent holdup.25 Yet others
appear to view switching costs as distinct from sunk costs, but
problematic only if the manufacturer has incurred sunk costs.26
In this Article, we show that many common descriptions or
understandings of the relationship between switching costs and
patent holdup can be misleading, if not outright wrong—and that
these misunderstandings matter, because an incorrect or imprecise
view of patent holdup can lead courts either to underestimate the
risk of holdup under a given set of circumstances (and thus,
perhaps, to grant injunctions too readily), or to overestimate it in
other cases (thus potentially causing them to spot holdup where it
does not exist).27 We believe, however, that if courts and other legal
actors are better able to distinguish the conditions that present a
serious risk of holdup from those that do not, they will be able to
formulate better rules and standards for deciding when to grant or
deny injunctions in a wide range of patent disputes including, but
certainly not limited to, suits filed by SEP owners and PAEs.
To assist in this endeavor, we present a simple model showing
that the key to understanding holdup is path dependence.28 In
general, path dependence refers to any situation in which a
decision maker’s options (or the relative desirability of such
options) have been affected by her prior decisions, causing market
conditions to evolve in a particular way. Most applications center
on prior decisions that are “self-reinforcing” for one reason or
another, making them more likely to be followed in the future, even
if better options arise.29 In the present context, path dependence
24. Id.
25. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
27. To be fair, many of our conclusions about the nature of patent holdup can
be found, in one form or another, in the existing law-and-economics literature.
Misunderstandings nevertheless persist; and, as noted in the text, can result in
either over- or underestimates of the risk of holdup in a given case.
28. See infra Part III.A.
29. Sunk costs and network effects are prominent sources of path
dependence. For example, the imperial measurement system persists in the
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means that once an implementer commits to a particular ex ante
technological choice, the technology’s incremental value over
alternatives is different ex post from what it was ex ante. When this
happens, an implementer armed with an injunction can extract an
ex post, holdup royalty up to the sum of (1) the manufacturer’s sunk
costs of adopting the infringing technology; (2) the difference
between the ex ante and ex post cost of adopting the noninfringing
alternative; and (3) the difference between the ex ante and ex post
benefit of adopting the alternative. Put another way, the holdup
royalty consists of sunk costs plus the opportunity cost of not
having chosen the noninfringing alternative ex ante.
As a result—and contrary to some common understandings of
patent holdup—we show that ex post switching costs, in the sense
of redesign and other related costs distinct from sunk costs, do not
contribute to patent holdup. In addition, although all three of the
sources of patent holdup described above share a common origin in
path dependence, any one of them can exist independently of the
others. Decision makers therefore need to understand not only
what the three components are (and what they are not), but also to
recognize that looking for one of the three sources independently
of the others (or, conversely, requiring evidence of all three in any
given case) will lead to over- or underestimates of the actual risk
of holdup, and thus potentially to injunction standards that are
either unduly lax or excessively rigorous.
Part II presents a brief overview of the existing
law-and-economics literature on injunctions, as well as both classic
and patent holdup. Part III presents our model, along with several
paradigm examples to assist legal decision makers in determining
whether a particular set of circumstances presents a serious risk
of patent holdup, or not. Part IV shows how our analysis of patent
holdup holds up, as it were, in light of arguments made by scholars
critical of the holdup concept. Part V concludes, followed by a
Technical Appendix.

United States and some other nations, despite being inferior to the metric system,
simply because it is already entrenched as the standard system and would be
cumbersome to switch. For general discussion of path dependence, see, e.g.,
Steven N. Durlauf, Path Dependence, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 10094 (3d ed. 2018); Douglas Puffert, Path Dependence in Technical
Standards, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 10106 (3d ed. 2018).
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II. Injunctions, Classic Holdup, and Patent Holdup
In this Part, we present a brief overview of the economic
literature on classic and patent holdup. We also show that the
relevant legal literature sometimes omits some important
nuances, and that legal analysts therefore may either over- or
underestimate the risk of patent holdup under a given set of
circumstances.
A. Injunctions
As we noted in the Introduction, until fairly recently, courts in
the United States almost always rewarded the prevailing patent
owner with an injunction, and courts in other parts of the world
still mostly continue to follow this practice.30 The principal
economic argument in favor of awarding injunctions—as opposed
to allowing the infringer to continue using the patented invention,
subject to an obligation to pay a court-determined ongoing
royalty—is derived from Calabresi and Melamed’s foundational
article Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral.31 In brief, the question Calabresi and
Melamed addressed is whether it is better to protect an
entitlement by means of a “property” rule—which enables the
owner of the entitlement to enjoin others from the unauthorized
use of the entitlement, and thus compels prospective users to
negotiate with the owner for permission to use—or a “liability”
rule, under which the user can, in effect, choose to breach and pay
court-determined damages.32
One advantage of property rules, Calabresi and Melamed
observed, is that a threat of injunctive relief channels parties into
voluntary negotiations, and thus conserves on adjudication costs.33
Moreover, the parties themselves often are in a better position
than a court would be to accurately determine the value of the
entitlement, in which case injunctions can reduce the risk and
30.
31.
32.
33.

See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1093–98.
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attendant costs of judicial error.34 Alternatively, if there is reason
to think that transaction costs or other bargaining obstacles might
foil the socially optimal outcome, perhaps because the number of
affected parties is large and disperse, or that the error and
adjudication costs resulting from judicial determinations would be
tolerably low, a liability rule may be preferable.35
Analysts inspired by Calabresi and Melamed have often
argued that, as a general matter, courts should protect intellectual
property (IP) by means of property rules rather than by means of
liability rules.36 The factual underpinning of the argument is that,
because IP assets are unique, they are particularly difficult for
third parties to value.37 Injunctions therefore exploit the parties’
presumed advantage in predicting the value each could expect to
derive from the use of the IP in comparison with other alternatives,
and thus in determining the terms, if any, under which licensing
would be more valuable to the owner than exclusion.38
On this view, then, by forcing the parties to bargain in the
shadow of an injunction, a property-rule entitlement conserves
judicial resources and reduces the risk of judicial error.39 This
latter advantage in particular looms large if one believes (as some
though not all observers do) that judicial errors in the aggregate
would not cancel out, but rather that courts would be more likely
to undercompensate, rather than overcompensate IP owners, thus
potentially undermining the incentive scheme at the heart of
patent and other IP laws.40 To the extent courts employ the legal
standards for calculating damages in a manner that is inconsistent
or unpredictable, moreover, the resulting uncertainty puts
risk-averse parties at a disadvantage and, at the margin, can deter
settlements.41
34. Id. at 1124–27.
35. Id. at 1105–10.
36. For an overview of the relevant literature, see Cotter & Golden, supra
note 5, at 392–94.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 12–14.
41. See Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Damages Heuristics, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 159, 168 (2017) (contending that a large range of possible outcomes would
result in fewer settlements and an increased likelihood of risk-adverse parties
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That said, even if one finds the above analysis generally
persuasive, there could be advantages to liability rules in specific
cases. One might imagine instances, for example, in which the
public interest in access to a patented invention (e.g., a life-saving
drug) is sufficiently great that a court or agency should sidestep
private bargaining and in effect compel the licensing of the
invention at a government-determined price. The social cost of
granting injunctions, in such cases, arguably outweighs the social
benefits (in terms of reducing adjudication and error costs).42
Indeed, even in the United States prior to eBay, courts on rare
occasions would decline to enter injunctions in favor of patent
owners on public interest grounds.43
As suggested in the Introduction, economists and legal
scholars today often argue that cases presenting patent holdup
risks are yet another example of situations in which the social
welfare costs of granting injunctions are potentially very high; high
enough, perhaps, to outweigh the adjudication and error costs that
may result from denying them.44 Of course, just because a case
presents a risk of patent holdup does not necessarily mean that, if
an injunction were to issue, the patent owner would actually
demand an excessive royalty; all other things being equal, it may
be rational for some patent owners to refrain from extracting
holdup rents even when they could do so, in order to avoid inviting
retaliation should they find themselves on the receiving end of
others’ licensing demands.45
settling on unfavorable terms).
42. On the other hand, it’s possible that compulsory licensing in such cases
could reduce social welfare if it were to inhibit the incentive to invest in the
development of new drugs that would benefit more people over the long term.
43. See, e.g., Cty. of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593
(7th Cir. 1934) (denying injunctive relief when the potential consequence, closing
a community’s only safe means for disposal of raw sewage, outweighs the interests
of the patentee); see also Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Res. Found.,
146 F.2d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 1945) (raising, but not deciding, the question of
whether an injunction against sales of oleomargarine would be against the public
interest).
44. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND
COMPETITION 40 (2007) [hereinafter ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT] (stating that
“reputation and business costs” may sometimes mitigate holdup).
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Moreover, even if the potential social costs of granting
injunctions are higher when a holdup risk is present than they are
in other cases, there is no obvious reason to expect the social costs
of denying them to be any lower; if anything, these costs could be
higher too, if a legal standard that makes injunctions hinge upon
a lack of holdup risk itself increases adjudication costs, or if
denying injunctions in a wider range of cases invites abuse on the
part of accused infringers or other unintended consequences, for
reasons we will touch upon in Part III. For these reasons, whether
the potential harms of granting injunctions, in cases in which
holdup risks are present, outweigh the potential harms of denying
them is a matter on which reasonable minds may differ, and with
respect to which each legal system must reach its own conclusion.
Be that as it may, a rational assessment of the matter requires
a clear understanding of what patent holdup is, the harms it
threatens, and the conditions under which the risk of encountering
it is serious. Armed with this knowledge, courts and other decision
makers can then evaluate the evidence and proceed as they see fit.
An erroneous understanding of what holdup is, by contrast, risks
over- or underestimating the potential harms of granting
injunctions in PAE, SEP, and other cases. To better enable
policymakers to grasp the issues, therefore, the following sections
sketch out the principal insights on holdup, in both the classic and
patent sense, as found in the relevant literature, as well as the
ambiguities that risk leading decision makers astray. In Part III,
we present our own model to isolate the three components of patent
holdup as identified, though not always clearly distinguished, in
the previous literature. We also offer some advice on how to detect
whether holdup risks are present, or not, in a range of real-world
cases.
B. Classic Holdup
The classic holdup literature dates back to the 1970s, with
work in which Oliver Williamson, Benjamin Klein, and other
economists sought to ground various forms of industrial
organization in the economics of transaction costs.46 Williamson in
46.

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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particular pioneered the idea that a recurring problem faced by
contracting parties is that of opportunism; which Williamson
defined as “self-interest seeking with guile.”47 As Williamson
observed, “[t]ransactions that are supported by investments in
durable, transaction-specific assets experience ‘lock-in’ effects”—a
condition Williamson referred to as “asset specificity”—which
makes such investments “risky, in that specialized assets cannot
be redeployed without sacrifice of productive value if contracts
should be interrupted or prematurely terminated.”48 In principle,
parties could minimize such risks if it were possible to address all
possible contingencies in advance, but such “exhaustive
stipulation, assuming that it is feasible, is itself costly.”49
Contracting parties therefore are faced with a dilemma:
Although both a have a long-term interest in effecting
adaptations of a joint profit-maximizing kind, each also has an
interest in appropriating as much of the gain as he can on each
occasion to adapt. Efficient adaptations that would otherwise be
made thus result in costly haggling or even go unmentioned,
lest the gains be dissipated by costly subgoal pursuit.
Governance structures that attenuate opportunism and
otherwise infuse confidence are evidently needed.50

Klein, along with Robert Crawford and Armen Alchian,
further developed the theory by showing how a party who is able
to renegotiate a contract might be able to extract some portion of
the other party’s quasi-rents.51 (“Quasi-rents,” otherwise known as
variable profits, are equal to total revenue minus total variable or
operating costs).52 To illustrate, Klein et al. used an example
involving a printing press owner (Firm A) that agrees to perform
printing services for Firm B for a price of $5,500 per day.53 Firm
A’s amortized fixed costs are $4,000 per day, the press’s
salvageable value if it is moved elsewhere is the daily rental
47. WILLIAMSON, supra note 13, at 47.
48. Id. at 52–54.
49. Id. at 115.
50. Id. at 63.
51. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 298–302.
52. Cheng-chung Lai & Guang-Jong Fann,
Reconsidered, 8 HIST. ECON. IDEAS 99, 101 (2000).
53. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 298–99.
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equivalent of $1,000, and the daily operating costs are $1,500.54
Over the long term, Firm A thus expects to break even on its
investment in the press, but its (short run) quasi-rent is $3,000
($5,500 - $1,500 - $1,000).55 In addition, the example posits that
the next-best option for Firm A would have been to contract with
Firm C, which offered $3,500 for the same type of services.56
Under this contract, A’s quasi-rent would have been $1,000
(though it would have lost $2,000 on its investment over time).57
Now suppose that Firm B could credibly threaten to walk away
from the contract unless A agreed to renegotiate the price. Having
already incurred the fixed cost of $4,000, A would be better off
agreeing to any renegotiated price above $2,000 (leaving it with a
quasi-rent of at least $1,000 and a long run amortized loss of at
most $2,000), because A’s next-best alternative (contracting with
C) would leave it even worse off.58 Put another way, B can
appropriate a portion of A’s quasi-rent up to the value of B’s
next-best alternative. Further, if there were no alternative
customer C ex post, B could appropriate up to the entire
nonsalvageable fixed cost of $3,000, since having incurred its fixed
cost B would be better off accepting this deal than walking away.59
Alternatively, depending on the facts, it’s possible that Firm B
could be the party practicing holdup by renegotiating a higher
price, if (say) A has incurred sunk costs in reliance on having the
printing job completed by a given date.60
Of course, parties do not invariably hold one another up in the
fashion of this stylized example. First, if either party develops a
reputation for sharp practice it may find its opportunities for
future transacting with other parties severely limited. Second,
even incomplete contracts do not permit B (or A) to credibly
demand renegotiation for any reason whatsoever, though as noted
above, the cost of drafting tighter contracts, monitoring them, and
if necessary, enforcing them is not zero. Third, parties who are
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 300.
Id.
Id. at 299–300.
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aware of the risks and fear being held up can demand a risk
premium— that is, a higher (or lower) price that takes into account
the perceived risk of future holdup—or decide that the risk is
intolerable and not enter into the transaction in the first place.
These added costs are a social waste, however, and at the margin
could discourage the formation of contracts that otherwise would
be in both parties’ best interest.
Williamson, Klein, and other holdup theorists therefore
predict that private and public actors will invest in reducing the
risk of holdup by, for example, vertically integrating different
actors along the supply chain or lobbying for government
regulation. All such measures come at a cost, however, and none of
them are perfect; though over a wide range of conduct they must
be reasonably effective, or else systemic holdup would be causing
markets to implode left and right.
C. Patent Holdup
To our knowledge, the first authors to apply the holdup
concept as described above to patent law issues were Robert
Merges and Richard Nelson in their 1990 article On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope.61 In their discussion of the economics
of improvement, Merges and Nelson presented an example
involving two inventions: an initial invention the value of which
over the next-best alternative is $100, and a subsequent invention
that incorporates but radically improves upon the original
invention, and whose value over alternatives is $900.62 If the initial
invention is patented, the owner can demand a share of the value
of the improvement (how much will depend on how good a
bargainer she is), thus leaving the second inventor with a
61. Robert Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990). George Bittlingmayer had earlier invoked
the concept of holdout to suggest that patent pools, which license multiple
complementary patents owned by different entities, could be viewed as a type of
“private condemnation” analogous to eminent domain. See George Bittlingmayer,
Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft Patent Agreement, 31 J.L. & ECON. 227,
242 (1988) (“[T]he rationale for a ‘private condemnation’ of patents that apply to
a product is like the rationale for eminent domain.”).
62. Merges & Nelson, supra note 61, at 866 n.117.
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comparatively small portion of the social value of the
improvement.63 Merges and Nelson viewed this result as analogous
to the type of holdup discussed by Klein et al., and argued that it
may inefficiently delay introduction of the improvement until the
initial patent expires or the parties agree to terms.64 Suzanne
Scotchmer further developed this theme in her 1991 article
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the
Patent Law, and explicitly noted how the second inventor’s
incentives are particularly weak if it has incurred sunk costs of
research and development prior to negotiating a license with the
dominant patent owner.65
Carl Shapiro’s 2001 book chapter Navigating the Patent
Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting66
nevertheless is often seen as the foundational paper on which most
of the current discussions of patent holdup are based.67 Shapiro
illustrated the concept of patent holdup by means of an example of
a manufacturer who
could, with ease, invent around a given patent, if that
manufacturer were aware of the patent and afforded sufficient
lead time. Clearly, in this case the patented technology
contributes little if anything to the final product, and any
reasonable royalty would be modest at best. But, oh, how the
situation changes if the manufacturer has already designed its
product and placed it into large scale production before the
patent issues . . . . The patentee can credibly seek far greater
royalties, very likely backed up with the threat of shutting down
the manufacturer if the Court indeed finds the patent valid and
infringed and grants injunctive relief. The manufacturer could
go back and redesign its product, but to do so (a) could well
require a major redesign effort and / or cause a significant
disruption to production, (b) would still leave potential liability
for any products sold after the patent issued before the
redesigned products are available for sale, and (c) could present
63. Id.
64. Id. at 865–67.
65. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 32–35 (1991) (“To
provide efficient incentives to the second innovator, society should protect the first
innovation so narrowly that a new product never infringes and therefore second
innovators never have to license.”).
66. 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 119–50 (2001).
67. Id.
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compatibility problems with other products or between different
versions of this product. In other words, for all of these reasons,
the manufacturer is highly susceptible to holdup by the
patentee. I submit that this holdup problem is very real today,
and that both patent and antitrust policymakers should regard
holdup as a problem of first order significance in the years
ahead . . . . The result will be that some companies avoid the
mine field altogether, that is, refrain from introducing certain
products for fear of holdup. Other companies will lose their
corporate legs, that is, will be forced to pay royalties on patents
that they could easily have invented around at an earlier stage,
had they merely been aware that such a patent either existed
or was pending. Of course, ultimately the expected value of
these royalties must be reflected in the price of final goods.68

Two things are notable in this discussion. First, it implicitly
presumes that the correct value of the patented invention is its
value prior to the manufacturer’s having “designed its product and
placed it into large scale production.”69 This is consistent with the
mainstream view (which we share) that the correct or baseline
royalty for a patented technology is its “ex ante” value over the
next-best available nonpatented alternative.70 Second, the
68. Id. at 125–26.
69. Id. at 125.
70. See Thomas F. Cotter et al., Reasonable Royalties in COMPLEX PRODUCTS,
supra note 6, at 6, 19, 28:
[There is] a widespread consensus among innovation economists and
lawyers that the social value of a technology is its incremental value
over the next-best alternative, and that the economic value of a
patented technology to an implementer is the (actual or expected)
profit or cost saving the implementer derives from the use of the
patented technology over the next-best available noninfringing
alternative . . . . [and that] the mainstream view in U.S. law [is that
the] hypothetical bargain [framework commonly used to estimate
reasonable royalties in litigation] should be based only on information
that is available to the parties ex ante . . . .
For further discussion of debates concerning the appropriate royalty baseline, see
Cotter, supra note 11, at 1164–65, 1172–73; Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F.
Cotter, A New Framework for Determining Reasonable Royalties in Patent
Litigation, 68 FLA. L. REV. 929, 953 n.73 (2016).We take no position in this Article
on the question of whether the patentee’s ability to charge a higher ex post royalty
should be considered holdup if that higher royalty reflects a greater-thanexpected advantage of the patented technology over alternatives. In other work,
two of us have argued that it should not. See Siebrasse & Cotter, infra note 82; cf.
Richard H. Stern, Who Should Own the Benefits of Standardization and the Value
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discussion identifies three distinct phenomena that could result in
the manufacturer agreeing to pay a royalty that exceeds the ex ante
value of the invention.71
The first is the cost that the manufacturer has incurred to
“design [ ] its product and place [ ] it into large scale production”
prior to being made aware of the existence of the patent.72 These
are past costs that were incurred to implement the current
technology. To the extent these past or “sunk” costs cannot be
redeployed to produce a noninfringing product, they are, to use
Williamson’s terminology, “asset-specific” and therefore capable of
generating lock-in effects.73 Much of the subsequent literature on
patent holdup refers to these investments simply as “sunk costs,”
and identifies sunk costs as a principal source of patent holdup.74
It Creates?, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 107, 125 (2018). The present Article
nevertheless concentrates on the three principal sources of patent holdup as
identified in the literature, all of which share a common source in path
dependence, and it remains agnostic on whether other conduct on the part of
patent owners should or should not be labeled “holdup.”
71. See Shapiro, supra note 66, at 125–26 (“[F]or all of these reasons, the
manufacturer is highly susceptible to holdup by the patentee.”).
72. See id. at 125. As noted in the text above, these costs are commonly
referred to in the patent holdup literature as sunk costs. That literature typically
does not make explicit reference to the “potential liability for any products sold
after the patent issued” as a source of patent holdup, but in principle such liability
could be viewed as a sunk cost (or perhaps more accurately, sunk liability), to the
extent it is an inevitable consequence of the manufacturer’s ex ante investment in
the marketing of an infringing product.
73. Williamson, supra note 13, at 52–54.
74. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10–1823JLR, 2013 WL
2111217, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015)
(“The threat of hold-up increases as the standard becomes more widely
implemented and firms make sunk cost investments . . . .”); Chryssoula
Pentheroudakis & Justus A. Baron, Licensing Terms of Standard Essential
Patents: A Comprehensive Analysis of Cases, JRC SCI. FOR POL’Y REP. 24–25, 138,
149 (2017) (citing Scotchmer, supra note 65) (stating that hold-up is intrinsically
related to irreversible sunk costs); FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 5, 8, 10, 26, 50,
92–93, 144, 175, 191 n.61, 215, 222, 225–26, 237 (2011) (discussing how sunk costs
lead to patent holdup); ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, supra note 45, at 35 (describing
sunk costs leading to patent hold-up due to increased expenses and low
bargaining leverage); Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, An Economic
Interpretation of FRAND, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 531, 535 (2013) (stating
that patent owners can demand royalties reflecting “not the incremental value of
the patented technology to the licensee . . . , but rather the market power that the
holder of [SEPs] has as a result of . . . . sunk investments made by firms
implementing that standard”); Bernard Chao, Horizontal Innovation and
Interface Patents, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 287, 303 (2015) (noting that a company which
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The intuition is that if the patent holder can credibly demand to
enjoin the use of the infringing technology ex post, the
manufacturer often would be better off agreeing to pay a royalty
that exceeds the technology’s ex ante value, rather than to write off
those asset-specific sunk costs as a loss. The extent of the excess
will depend on the parties’ relative bargaining power, but as we
show in Part III it could be as high as the entire sunk cost.
To be sure, this consequence is not identical to the types of
holdup discussed in the classic holdup literature, the archetypal
example of which as described above involves one party to an
existing transaction demanding some type of ex post concession
from the other; in the version of “patent holdup” under
consideration here, by contrast, there often is no initial agreement
between a buyer and a seller.75 (As in the classic holdup scenario,
however, one party is using its ex post leverage to extract a
quasi-rent from the other, in this case a royalty that exceeds the

has sunk investments into designing, manufacturing and marketing a product is
particularly vulnerable to patent assertions); Chiang, supra note 21, at 694–96,
698–702; Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework for
RAND and Other Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1451, 1487,
1492–93, 1496 (2015) (“[I]rreversible investments can allow a patentee to charge
higher royalties than the patentee could obtain in a hypothetical negotiation that
occurs before the specific investments are made.”); Richard Gilbert, Deal or No
Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting Organizations, 77 ANTITRUST
L.J. 855, 855 (2011) (describing how owners of patents may “hold up” firms or
consumers that are “locked-in” to a standard by charging high royalties); Farrell
et al., supra note 21, at 604, 612–13; Suzanne Michel, Bargaining for RAND
Royalties in the Shadow of Patent Remedies Law, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 889, 892 n.9,
892–93, 896, 911 (2011) (defining holdup as the ability to extract higher fees after
an accused infringer has sunk costs into implementation); William F. Lee & A.
Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL
L. REV. 385, 409–11 (2016) (expanding on the effects of lock-in costs); Jonathan
D. Putnam, Economic Determinations in “FRAND Rate”-Setting: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 41 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 953, 962 (2018) (“Hold-up is a form of economic
opportunism . . . .”).
75. In SEP cases, however, some courts understand the SEP owner’s
commitment to license its patents on FRAND terms to create a contract for the
benefit of third parties, the precise terms of which nevertheless are undefined ex
ante. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir.
2015) (describing the appellee Microsoft as “a third-party beneficiary to
Motorola’s RAND commitments”). So at least under these circumstances, the
incomplete nature of the contract can enable opportunism, as in the classic holdup
scenario.
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baseline royalty the parties would have agreed to ex ante.76) In
addition, there is not (necessarily) any “guile” on the part of the
patent owner, for example in the sense of keeping its patent a
secret until the infringer is “locked in”—though guile is surely a
possibility, and when it is present the patent holder is sometimes
accused of engaging in a species of sunk-costs holdup referred to as
“patent ambush.”77 (We will discuss this variation on the theme of
sunk-costs holdup in Part III.B, but for now it suffices to note that
guile is not a necessary condition for the holder to be able to
demand an ex post royalty that reflects sunk costs).78 What is
necessary is that the infringer failed to negotiate a royalty in
76. See ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, supra note 45, at 35 n.11. In this regard,
patent holdup may seem more analogous to “holdout” in the real estate context,
as described by Williamson, supra note 13. In this latter context, there is no
preexisting agreement between prospective buyers and sellers, and a prospective
seller uses its leverage ex post (after other sellers have reached agreement) to
extract a disproportionate share of the expected gain.
77. Cotter, supra note 11, at 1188–89.
78. The absence of guile as a necessary condition for sunk-costs patent
holdup leads some commentators to argue that the latter is not a type of holdup
at all, but simply a matter of the infringer not wanting to pay what the patent
owner demands. Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber, The Fallacies of
Patent-Holdup Theory, 13 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 23–24 (2017). The
premise, however, that holdup cannot exist in the absence of guile because parties
can anticipate, and thus prepare in advance for, the possibility of being held up
ex post arguably overlooks the potential inefficiencies that can result from having
to take such defensive measures ex ante. Id. In the present context, and for
reasons discussed in the text above, even in the absence of guile it is socially
inefficient for the patent owner to extract an ex post royalty that reflects sunk
costs. Id. The fact that the inefficiency results from a set of circumstances that
differ in some respects from those giving rise to classic holdup does not make it
any less inefficient. Id.
Furthermore, even in the classic holdup literature, scholars do not
uniformly agree that guile is a necessary condition for holdup. See William P.
Rogerson, Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem, 59 REV. ECON. STUD.
777, 777 (1992):
A hold-up problem occurs when two factors are present. First, parties
to a future transaction must make non-contractible specific
investments prior to the transaction in order to prepare for it. Second,
the exact form of the optimal transaction (e.g. how many units if any,
what quality level, the time of delivery) cannot be specified with
certainty ex ante.
See also Williamson, supra note 13, at 47 (stating that “[b]y opportunism, I mean
self-interest seeking with guile . . . . More generally, opportunism refers to the
incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts
to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse.”).
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advance of incurring the sunk cost.79 Among the possible reasons
for not doing so are a lack of actual awareness of the patent or its
relevance to the infringer’s product, and the perceived need to
launch a product quickly before clearing all potential rights (as is
said to be common in industries such as telecommunications).80 Of
course, if courts routinely deny injunctions based on the risk of
sunk costs holdup, the incentive on the part of implementers to
come up with ways of discovering and clearing the necessary rights
in advance may be reduced—particularly if the damages courts
award in lieu of injunctions are below the ex ante amount, due to
error costs, or are otherwise undercompensatory. This is the
so-called holdout phenomenon discussed in Part III below, and we
agree with the critics of patent holdup theory that if and when such
practices occur the resulting social costs could weigh in favor of
granting injunctions, notwithstanding the corresponding risk of
sunk costs holdup.81 For now, though, we note only that, in theory,
the risk of being subjected to patent holdup could discourage some
implementers from marketing products that might render them
vulnerable to being held up ex post; and that, as in the classic
holdup context, such a risk threatens to make both parties (here,
patent owners and implementers) worse off. In addition, in the
patent holdup context there is a risk of dynamic inefficiency, in
that if the implementer accedes to the owner’s demand for a royalty
that exceeds the value of the invention over the next-best available
nonpatented alternative, the implementer (and, by extension, the
consumers who buy the implementer’s products) is paying more for
the patented invention than it is worth, in terms of its contribution
to the state of the art.82
79. See FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 22 (stating that a potential infringer
may be able to avoid hold up if royalties are negotiated in advance of incurring
sunk costs).
80. See id. at 226 (stating the lack of notice of a patent is especially prevalent
in IT industries); Lee & Melamed, supra note 74, at 404–09 (explaining how the
patent system places the practical burden of avoiding infringement on potential
infringers); Shapiro, supra note 66, at 126 (noting the holdup problem is worse in
industries with thousands of patents pending and issued).
81. See infra Part III.
82. See Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, The Value of the
Standard, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1159, 1184, 1189–90 (2017) (arguing that sunk costs
holdup is dynamically inefficient because it results in an excessive incentive to
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The second potential source of patent holdup that Shapiro
referred to in his 2001 paper is the cost of redesigning a
noninfringing product, including the possible disruption of current
production.83 In contrast to the first source of patent holdup, this
is a future cost of implementing the alternative technology.84
Subsequent literature asserts that this ex post cost of
implementing a noninfringing alternative will often exceed what
the ex ante cost of implementing the alternative would have been,
and that the manufacturer will agree to pay a royalty exceeding
the value of the infringing technology in order to avoid shouldering
this cost increase.85 Note, however, that if the ex ante and ex post
costs of adopting the alternative are identical, the fact that the
user would incur these costs ex post if it were to switch—and would
be willing to pay something to avoid having to do so—does not
generate an additional source of holdup rents, since the user would
have faced the very same calculus had the parties negotiated ex
ante.86
Third are what Shapiro referred to as “compatibility
problems.”87 As developed in the subsequent literature, the
intuition here is that, if the manufacturer were to switch to a
invent).
83. See Shapiro, supra note 66, at 125 (stating that redesign “could well
require a major re-design effort and/or cause a significant disruption to
production”).
84. Id.
85. See ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, supra note 45, at 35 (explaining the
unequal bargaining power in hold-up problems); Pentheroudakis & Baron, supra
note 74, at 55 (describing the ex ante negotiation benchmark); FTC REPORT, supra
note 11, at 22, 190 (noting that the result of a negotiation can vary significantly
depending on when one assumes it occurs); Farrell et al., supra note 21, at 650 &
n.168 (stating one could examine whether ex ante switching costs differ from ex
post switching costs); Lee & Melamed, supra note 74, at 410–11, 410 n.106, 411
n.107 (providing an example in which an infringer is willing to pay costs greater
than the cost ex ante); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 2000–05 (explaining
how royalty “overcharge,” is driven by the threat of obtaining an injunction and
the rules by which reasonable royalties are calculated); A. Douglas Melamed &
Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More
Effective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110, 2113 (2018) (explaining that “negotiations between
SEP holders and implementers generally take place only after the implementers
have used and infringed the technologies claimed by the SEPs”); Shapiro, supra
note 11, at 286–94.
86. For further explication of this point, see supra Part II.A.
87. Shapiro, supra note 66, at 125.
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noninfringing alternative ex post, it might have to either
(1) redesign other complementary components or products to
interact with that alternative, or (2) forgo the benefits of selling a
product that enjoys substantial network externalities (for example,
a standard-compliant smartphone that enables consumers to
communicate with people who use smartphones made by other
manufacturers).88 In the first case, the “compatibility problems”
would simply result in another set of redesign costs, but in the
second the harm could be thought of as a loss of expected benefits;
and to avoid that loss, the manufacturer might agree, once again,
to pay an ex post royalty that exceeds the infringing technology’s
ex ante value. This is not an out-of-pocket cost as such, but a future
loss of profits associated with switching from the current
technology to the alternative. Farrell et al., for example, present a
stylized example in which, ex ante, a standard setting organization
(SSO) chooses between two competing standards, either of which
would confer upon consumers a compatibility (network) benefit in
the amount of $30.89 Once the SSO chooses between the two,
however, the ex post network benefit derived from switching to the
alternative is zero:
If each user's leading alternative to sticking with the standard
is unilateral switching, and thus losing compatibility with
88. See Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 82, at 1172 (citing Michael L. Katz &
Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. 424, 424, 434 (1985)):
Network effects arise when the value a user derives from consumption
of a good increases with the number of other agents consuming the
good. Communication technologies are a classic example: the more
people that have telephones, the more valuable a telephone is to any
given person. While network effects may arise in the absence of
standards, and de facto standards may arise as a consequence of
network effects even in the absence of formal standards, a major reason
for the existence of formal standards is to allow the market to
coordinate on a single technology in order to reap the benefits of
network externalities. Consequently, formal standards are normally
associated with network effects.
As we show in Part II, in this context the loss that presents a holdup risk is not
the loss of network benefits associated with the infringing (standardized)
technology, but (counterintuitively) the loss of network benefits associated with
the alternative. See supra Part II.B.
89. Farrell et al., supra note 21, at 616.
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others,
then
the
patent
holder's
subsequent
advantage . . . includes not only its technology's inherent
advantage and the value of the user's own sunk investments,
but also the value of compatibility to the user . . . . For example,
compliance with some telecommunications standards enables a
network operator to offer its customers the ability to roam onto
compatible networks. In our numerical example, suppose that
the two technologies produce incompatible, though otherwise
identical, outputs, and that compatibility with other users is
worth $30. Then, if all others are expected to stick to the
patented technology, adopting it is worth $30 more to each user.
The user will adopt the patented technology as long as the
royalty demanded is less than $40, composed of $10 of inherent
value and $30 of network effect.90

The economic literature on patent holdup, as recounted above,
has been insightful in identifying these sources of path-dependent
patent holdup. As described in the Introduction, however,
problems can arise when legal scholars and decision makers try to
apply these insights, due to the ambiguous and inconsistent usage
of the term—which we ourselves have avoided using in this section
up till now—“switching costs.” Intuitively, it might seem that
“switching costs” are simply the costs that would have to be
incurred in switching to the best alternative to the patented
technology. To define switching costs in that forward-looking
sense, however, neglects the classic holdup problem, which focuses
on sunk costs, and sunk costs necessarily are past costs.
Accordingly, in one sense of the term, switching costs refer to the
user’s ex post inability to recoup its investment in the infringing
90. Id. See also ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, supra note 45, at 38 (“Generally,
the greater the cost of switching to an alternative standard, the more an IP holder
can charge for a license.”); FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 192 (“Accused infringers
may pay royalties based on the costs of switching to another technology.
Switching costs can be prohibitively high when an industry standard is
involved.”); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 2016 (“[T]he key point is that it
can be extremely costly, or even impossible as a practical matter, to “redesign” a
product standard to avoid infringing a patented technology, even if initially an
alternative standard could easily have been selected.”); Timothy S. Simcoe &
Allan L. Shampine, Economics of Patents and Standardization: Network Effects,
Hold-up, Hold-out, Stacking, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL
STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 100, 105 (Jorge L.
Contreras ed. 2018) (stating that “lack of compatibility . . . is related to network
effects,” and that “ex post, an implementer is likely to perceive loss of
compatibility with their own and others’ installed base as a substantial switching
cost”).
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technology, if it switches to a noninfringing alternative, and thus
includes sunk costs. If that’s all there is to switching costs,
however, then one might conclude that the risk of holdup is low
whenever those sunk costs themselves are low; but this could lead
to an underestimate of the risk of holdup, if the other two potential
components are present.
Alternatively, one might view switching costs as distinct from
sunk costs, consisting of the ex post cost of adopting the
noninfringing alternative (the cost of redesign, etc.). As Shapiro
and other economists have shown, however—and as the model we
introduce in Part III affirms—what actually matters are not the ex
post redesign costs as such, but rather the difference between the
ex ante and ex post costs of adopting the alternative.91 Much of the
legal (and even some of the economic) literature nevertheless fails
to make this point explicitly,92 and thus risks leading courts and
91. See infra Part III.A.
92. See ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, supra note 45, at 7:
If a technology lacks effective substitutes because an SSO chose to
include it in a standard, and the costs associated with switching to an
alternative standard are high, the owner of patents on that technology
may be able to hold up firms wishing to implement the standard by
setting higher royalties and less favorable licensing terms than it could
have done before the standard was set . . . .
See also FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 5, 189–92, 190 n.53, 222, 225, 225 n.50,
243; Carlton & Shampine, supra note 74, at 535 (describing “opportunities for the
holders of patents to seek royalty rates that are driven, not by the ex ante
incremental value of their technology to prospective licensees compared to other
alternatives, but by the incremental market power . . . that inclusion of the
technology in the standard confers on the patent holder”); Chao, supra note 74, at
303 (“Ex post compatibility value is the value a patent possesses because it allows
patent holders to “holdup” a company that has already adopted the patented
technology”); Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2014) (“[W]hen a patent is asserted after a
product is made, the patentee has the upper hand, due not to the economic value
of the technology, but instead to the high cost of changing the product to avoid the
implicated technology.”); Contreras & Gilbert, supra note 74, at 1456, 1468, 1488
(stating, inter alia, that "[e]x post, a patent owner may be able to charge royalties
that reflect the cost of switching to an alternative technology, which may be very
high”); Gilbert, supra note 74, at 862 ("If the patented technology is adopted after
the standard issues and the adopting firm and consumers make investments that
are specific to the standard, the cost of switching to the alternative technology is
prohibitively expensive"); John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX.
L. REV. 505, 518 (2010) (“Strong patent rights might force such a ‘trapped’ party
to pay a licensing fee based more on switching costs than the more intrinsic value
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other legal actors to conclude, erroneously, that if the ex post cost
of redesign is high there is, ipso facto, a substantial risk of holdup.
This error could result in an overestimate of the risk of holdup in
a given case.
On the other hand, much of the existing literature (including
even the economic literature) appears to rest on the premise that
switching costs can give rise to holdup only if the implementer has
incurred substantial asset-specific sunk costs.93 As we will show,
however, if by switching costs one means (increased) redesign
costs, this assumption will not always hold true. Rather, sunk costs
and increased redesign costs, as well as forgone network benefits,
are all distinct sources of patent holdup, although each of the three
has a common origin in path dependence.94 To be sure, we suspect
that, in most circumstances in which there is a substantial gap
between the expected ex ante and ex post costs and benefits of
adopting the alternative, the infringer also will have incurred some
sunk costs to implement the infringing technology; such costs
would contribute to path dependence to the extent they alter the
relative costs and benefits of adopting the alternative.95
of the patented invention.”); Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent
Infringement: A Transactional Model, 45 HOUSTON L. REV. 1165, 1184, 1187
(2008) (“When the infringer’s switching costs are larger than the
post-adjudication license fee the patentee can credibly demand, then the infringer
will pay to continue to use the patented technology.”); Daryl Lim, Standard
Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone Wars: Triangulating the End
Game, 119 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 76 (2014) (stating that “patent owners obtain
power over price because of the high switching cost involved.”); Michel, supra note
74, at 891, 896–97, 904 (2011) (stating, inter alia, that “an injunction or its threat
can also effectuate patent holdup, leading a manufacturer to pay royalties based
on its switching costs rather than the value of the patented technology”); Ted
Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517,
522–23, 528, 538, 548, 554–55, 565–67, 571 (2014) (arguing that if the ex post cost
of redesign is high, there is a substantial risk of holdup).
93. See ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, supra note 45, at 38 n.25 (“The most direct
source of switching costs is the difference between the cost of acquiring new
infrastructure to implement a new standard and the salvage value of current
infrastructure . . .”); FTC REPORT, supra note 11, at 5, 22, 58, 79, 144, 222 (“At the
time a manufacturer faces an infringement allegation, switching to an alternative
technology may be very expensive if it has sunk costs in production using the
patented technology.”); Stern, supra note 70, at 122 (describing a situation in
which the holder of a patent withholds the existence of the patent and waits for a
producer to sink costs and adopt the technology).
94. See supra Part III.A.
95. See Durlauf, supra note 29 (defining path dependence).
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But imagine a situation in which an SSO of which a particular
manufacturer is not a member adopts a standard, and the
manufacturer now wants to make and sell standard-compliant
devices. The manufacturer may not have incurred any sunk costs
prior to standard adoption, but ex post the costs and benefits of
adopting an alternative technology are much different from what
they would have been ex ante (prior to standard adoption), and the
manufacturer may be subject to holdup as a result.96 As in the first
example, however, we worry that in such a case courts or other
legal actors might underestimate the risk of holdup, in this
instance on the basis of a misperception that high sunk costs are a
necessary condition for holdup to arise.
III. Modeling Patent Holdup
In Section A of this Part, we present a simple model that
identifies and isolates the three sources of path-dependent patent
holdup. In addition, we will show that: (1) patent holdup can arise
from any of the three sources, and thus that nonsalvageable sunk
costs are not a necessary condition; (2) high switching costs, as
such, are irrelevant; and (3) what is relevant is the difference
between the expected ex ante and ex post costs and benefits of
adopting the alternative—or, to put it another way, the infringer’s
opportunity cost of not having chosen the noninfringing alternative
ex ante. As a result, conventional understandings of patent holdup
that gloss over these points pose of a risk of either over- or
underestimating holdup risk under a given set of circumstances.
In Section B, we present some illustrative examples of when a risk
of holdup may, or may not, be present.
A. The Model
Assume that there are two (substitute) technologies, indexed
by 𝑡 = 1, 2, and that there are two stages, ex ante and ex post. In
96. Another possible example would be one in which all or most of the sunk
costs are salvageable, that is, can be easily redeployed to make use the
noninfringing alternative rather than the patented technology.
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the ex ante stage, an implementer can choose to adopt one of the
technologies. Adoption of technology 𝑡 requires an upfront fixed
cost investment of 𝐾𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑘𝑡 , where 𝛼, 𝑘𝑡 ≥ 0. Here 𝑘2 gives the
technology-specific component of 𝐾𝑡 , while 𝛼 describes any joint
cost savings that could be redeployed to the other technology.
Choosing technology 𝑡 ex ante will provide a variable profit (total
revenue minus total variable cost) of 𝜋𝑡 ,97 providing a total profit
of 𝜋𝑡 − 𝐾𝑡 , provided that the implementer does not switch
technologies ex post.
Let 𝑡 ∗ denote the technology adopted ex ante, and let 𝑡 = 3 − 𝑡 ∗
denote the alternative. The ex post stage occurs just after 𝑡 ∗ has
been adopted, and surrounds potential switching to 𝑡. The joint
cost 𝛼 can be redeployed to 𝑡, and thus need not be reincurred.
Instead, the implementer must pay only a 𝑡-specific fixed cost
𝑘𝑡|𝑡 ∗ —the ex post adoption cost of 𝑡 conditional on ex ante adoption
of 𝑡 ∗ . Similarly, conditional on ex ante adoption of 𝑡 ∗ , the
implementer will obtain variable profit of 𝜋𝑡|𝑡 ∗ if it switches to 𝑡 ex
post. The notation reflects that we are allowing the costs and
revenues of adopting a given technology to depend on whether it
was adopted ex ante, or switched-to ex post. We assume ex ante
expectations are accurate, so that 𝜋𝑡 ∗ |𝑡 ∗ = 𝜋𝑡 ∗ and 𝑘𝑡 ∗ |𝑡 ∗ = 0, where
the latter reflects that the fixed cost of adopting 𝑡 ∗ need not be
incurred again if the implementer declines to switch.
We say that ex ante commitment to 𝑡 ∗ generates path
dependence if either 𝑘𝑡|𝑡 ∗ > 𝑘𝑡 , 𝜋𝑡|𝑡 ∗ < 𝜋𝑡 , or 𝑘𝑡 ∗ > 𝑘𝑡 ∗ |𝑡 ∗ = 0. Such
conditions, if satisfied, reflect some dynamic change in the relative
commercial value of 𝑡 that is causally attributable to ex ante
adoption of 𝑡 ∗ . This can happen if there is a reduction in the overall
profitability of the alternative (𝑘𝑡|𝑡 ∗ ≠ 𝑘𝑡 or 𝜋𝑡|𝑡 ∗ < 𝜋𝑡 ), and these
effects can be regarded as opportunity costs of not having adopted
the alternative ex ante. Alternatively, in the more familiar case,
the change in relative value may arise because sunk costs have left
the patented invention with higher marginal value (𝑘𝑡 ∗ > 0). We
provide some intuitive examples in Section B below.
To model patent holdup, suppose that technology 1 is patented
while technology 2 is not,98 and that technology 1 is superior in
97. This can be interpreted as an expected present discounted value.
98. If both technologies are patented, there is price competition between the
patented technologies (both ex ante and ex post). But, to the extent this results in
different fee offerings for the alternative ex post versus ex ante, this is attributable
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that it provides a greater ante total profit (𝜋1 − 𝐾1 > 𝜋2 − 𝐾2 ). In
the model presented here, we suppress patent uncertainty and
simply assume that litigation expectations are sufficient to ensure
that the implementer would rather take up the alternative than
infringe and litigate.99
If the implementer and patentee bargained ex ante, the
maximal fee the patentee could charge would be

ℱ 𝐴 = 𝜋1 − 𝑘1 − [𝜋2 − 𝑘2 ]
Thus, the maximal ex ante fee is increasing (decreasing) in 𝜋1
and 𝑘2 (𝑘2 and 𝜋2 ) and invariant in 𝛼. Holdup can occur when
licensing negotiations do not occur until the ex post stage. The fixed
cost 𝑘1 is now sunk and, at the margin, the costs or benefits of
technology 2 may have changed as a result of the prior
commitment to 1. Conditional on this ex ante choice, the maximal
fee the patentee can obtain through ex post negotiations is

ℱ 𝑃 = 𝜋1 − [𝜋2|1 − 𝑘2|1 ]
We define the holdup rents as the difference between ℱ 𝐴 and
ℱ , or the increase in the implementer’s willingness to pay for a
license when licensing terms are not negotiated until ex post.
𝑃

to the same factors that facilitate holdup, as identified below. When the two ex
ante technologies are patented, there is at present no theoretical consensus on
what the appropriate royalty should be. See Norman V. Siebrasse, Holdup,
Holdout, and Royalty Stacking: A Review of the Literature, in COMPLEX PRODUCTS,
supra note 6, at 239, 241–42.
99. In the Technical Appendix, we endogenize patent uncertainty (the
patentee’s winning probability) and remedies. Our findings about holdup and
path dependence do not change, and the changes that do arise are already
explicated in Lemley & Shapiro. Lemley & Shapiro supra note 11, at 2035–39.
The biggest change, as Lemley and Shapiro explain, is that the probabilistic
nature of patent validity and infringement can result in license fees being
systematically excessive, which they refer to as an “overcharge,” even when
negotiated ex ante. See id. at 2002. This overcharge is separate from holdup,
which, as we state above, refers to an increase in the ex post royalty rate as
compared with the rate that could have been negotiated ex ante, that does not
result from an increase in the anticipated value of the patented technology.
Because the overcharge identified by Lemley and Shapiro also arises ex ante, it
does not represent holdup in that sense.
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Proposition. Holdup rents are equal to

ℋ = 𝑘1 + Δ𝜋2 + Δ𝑘2
where Δ𝜋2 ≡ 𝜋2 − 𝜋2|1 and Δ𝑘2 ≡ 𝑘2|1 − 𝑘2 .
This simple equation clarifies what phenomena ultimately
contribute to patent holdup. Consistent with classic (nonpatent)
holdup, the first term is simply the technology-specific sunk cost
investment 𝑘1 in the patented technology. This reflects a form of
path dependence, because the choice to invest in 𝑘1 alters the
relative value of the technologies going forward. The terms Δ𝜋2 and
Δ𝑘2 reflect potential opportunity costs of adopting technology 2 ex
post rather than ex ante. This demonstrates that the relationship
between technology-switching and holdup is ultimately driven by
path dependence effects.
Corollary 1. Holdup rents are positive if and only if ex ante
commitment to the patented invention generates path dependence.
Corollary 2. The switching cost 𝑘2|1 does not independently
reveal anything about the magnitude of the holdup rents.
Hence, even if the redesign cost 𝑘2|1 is quite large, it influences
holdup only to the extent that it exceeds 𝑘2 , the cost of adopting
technology 2 ex ante. Thus, holdup rents are not increasing in the
size of the redesign cost, but rather in the size of the opportunity
cost Δ𝑘2 , which captures the increase in the cost of adopting the
alternative. On the other hand, even if redesign costs and sunk
costs are zero, holdup may still arise, for ex ante commitment to
technology 1 may diminish the post-adoption variable profitability
of technology 2. That is, 𝜋2|1 may fall below 𝜋2 . An immediate
implication is that it is a mistake to regard large fixed costs as an
essential ingredient of patent holdup.100
100. Apart from litigation uncertainty and bargaining strength, which we
ignore, the holdup royalty identified by Shapiro, supra note 11, at 287–303, turns
on the cost of redesigning the product to avoid using the patented feature. Shapiro
denotes this redesign cost as “F,” and it is clearly a forward looking redesign cost,
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As one would expect, in the absence of path dependence effects
distorting the value of the alternative (i.e. when Δ𝜋2 = 𝛥𝑘2 = 0),
our model reduces to the standard point that ex post opportunism
allows
the
patentee
to
extract
the
implementer’s
technology-specific sunk cost investment.
B. Examples
1. Sunk Costs
For an example of patent holdup attributable to sunk costs
alone, consider the facts of Riles v. Shell Exploration & Production
Co.101 Riles owned a patent on a method for installing the
foundation for an oil drilling platform, which Shell was found to
have infringed.102 Shell’s evidence suggested that the value of the
invention over alternative nonpatented methods was about
$350,000.103 The ex ante royalty (ℱ 𝐴 ) therefore would have been no
more than this amount. Shell infringed the patent in laying the
foundation for a platform, and then built a platform atop the
foundation at a cost of $84 million.104
In the actual case, it appears that Riles did not seek an
injunction, but did argue that he was entitled to a reasonable
royalty based on what Shell would have been willing to pay if the
district court had enjoined Shell’s use of the platform.105 That
id. at 287, corresponding to the cost we denote by k2/1—the cost of switching to
the alternative given that the patented technology was adopted. In the case
Shapiro is concerned with, when the redesign cost for the alternative is higher
than it would have been ex ante, and differential profits from the alternative
technology are zero, then k2/1 can be expressed as k2 + D. That is, in Shapiro’s
model, holdup turns on F = k2 + D. In our model, in contrast, in this scenario the
holdup rent H = k1 + D. The reason for this apparent difference is that Shapiro
implicitly assumes that k1 = k2, in which case the two expressions are equal.
101. 298 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
102. Id. at 1305–06.
103. Id. at 1313.
104. Id. at 1311.
105. See id. (stating Riles’ expert’s theory: “Shell's construction of the
platform with a patented method could result in an injunction . . . . If such an
injunction were in place . . . Shell would have had to choose between abandoning
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amount would have dwarfed the $350,000 ex ante value of the
invention: assuming, for lack of any evidence one way or the other,
that the costs and benefits of adopting the nonpatented method did
not change,106 ex post Shell would be better off paying a royalty up
to just under $84,350,000, rather than abandoning the project
altogether. In terms of Proposition 1 above, 𝑘1 = $84,000,000, Δ𝜋2
= 0, and Δ𝑘2 = 0, so ℋ = 𝑘1 + Δ𝜋2 + Δ𝑘2 = $84,000,000. Fortunately
for Shell, the court rejected the argument that Riles could have
enjoined Shell’s use of the platform, notwithstanding Shell’s use of
the patented method to construct the platform, and concluded that
the royalty the jury actually awarded (a mere $8.7 million) was
excessive.107
Riles thus illustrates how, in a case involving large,
nonsalvageable sunk costs, an injunction could enable a patent
owner to extract an excessive royalty ex post, as well as how courts
can employ this understanding to rein in excessive damages
awards. Of course, each case must turn on its own facts, and
sometimes it may not be as easy as it was in Riles to determine
what those sunk costs are. In cases involving technical standards,
for example, the evidence might show that most of the cost the
infringer incurs to implement a particular feature could be
redeployed if it were to implement a noninfringing alternative; or,
conversely, it might show that not only the cost of deploying the
feature, but also a range of complementary investments in other
standard-compliant features would be lost if the infringer switched
or abandoned.108 Nevertheless, it may not always be necessary to
determine the value of the sunk costs with precision. If the ex ante
value of the technology can be estimated with tolerable accuracy,
its $84 million platform or paying Riles a percentage”).
106. If Shell had to demolish the existing platform in order to install a new
one using the nonpatented method for laying the foundation, the ex post redesign
costs almost surely would exceed ex ante costs. See supra Part II.B. Our example
above abstracts away from this contingency.
107. See id. at 1311–13 (rejecting Riles’ argument and declaring the jury
award excessive).
108. The discussion of sunk costs should note that sunk costs may refer to the
investment in the industry as a whole, not just technology to the particular
standard, when it comes to a standard. See, e.g., Carlton & Shampine, supra note
74, at 542 (describing a situation in which collective voting can allow a patent
holder to hold up an individual firm within an industry); Farrell et al., supra note
21, at 616 (noting that holdup can be especially severe for industry standards).
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and if (by any measure) the sunk costs are disproportionate to that
value, then it is reasonable to conclude that a serious holdup risk
is present.109
2. Increase in Costs of Adopting the Alternative
As noted above, commentaries on patent holdup frequently
highlight the costs of switching to an infringing product to replace
the patented component with a noninfringing alternative. What
actually matters, though, is not the cost of adopting the
alternative, as such, but rather the amount by which this cost post
exceeds the cost of adopting the alternative ex ante—in terms of
Proposition 1 above, Δ𝑘2 (≡ 𝑘2|1 − 𝑘2 ), not 𝑘2|1 itself.
To illustrate, imagine that the patented and alternative
technologies are plumbing valve configurations.110 Ex ante, a
contractor must decide which valve type to install, and it will make
this decision at an intermediate stage of the home’s construction,
before the walls and flooring are installed.111 This installation cost
is 𝑘𝑡 for valve technology 𝑡. For simplicity, the valves are
incompatible but equivalent; one valve works as well as the other,
so the value of the house is the same regardless of the choice, and
the valves themselves cost the same, so the choice is arbitrary.112
If the contractor had to switch ex post, after the home’s
construction was complete, it would have to temporarily tear down
the walls and floors to get at the plumbing; this deconstruction
imposes its own cost 𝐷 > 0, which is independent of the valve
technology.113 Thus, if technology 1 is adopted ex ante and its use

109. This is not necessarily to say that an injunction should be refused, as
that would require consideration of other factors, such as whether ex ante
bargaining would have been feasible, and how difficult it is to accurately assess a
reasonable royalty in lieu of an injunction. See Siebrasse et al., supra note 7, at
144–59.
110. This example is adapted from a famous case dealing with contract
remedies and their potential to facilitate holdup. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v.
Kent, 230 N.Y. 239 (1921).
111. Id. at 240.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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were to be enjoined ex post, the ex post cost of switching to
technology 2 would be 𝑘2|1 = 𝑘2 + 𝐷, and the holdup royalty
ℋ = 𝑘1 + 𝐷, or the sunk cost of installing the original valve plus
the heightened cost of redesign.114
Note, however, that redesign contributes to holdup only to the
extent that it comprises some extra cost that would not have arisen
if the implementer had originally designed its product around the
alternative technology. The cost of implementing the alternative
technology, 𝑘2 , does not represent holdup, even though it is a cost
that has to be incurred to switch, simply because that cost would
have been incurred even if technology 2 had been adopted in the
first place.
To see why this is important, modify the hypothetical to
assume that the two valves still work equally well, but valve
technology 1 is easier and cheaper to install, so that 𝑘1 < 𝑘2. In
that case, the forward-looking “switching costs” (in the intuitive
sense of the cost of switching to the new technology), or 𝑘2 + 𝐷, will
be very high, because of the costs of installing valves with
technology 2. But the holdup royalty is still ℋ = 𝑘1 + 𝐷. The
difference between the two, 𝑘2 − 𝑘1 , represents the value of
technology 1 over technology 2, and there is nothing wrong with
allowing the patentee to extract some part of that difference. Thus,
the fact that the forward-looking cost of switching is high does not
in itself signal patent holdup. It is only 𝐷, the increased cost of
implementing technology 2, which contributes to holdup, along
with the sunk cost of having adopted technology 1.

114. Perhaps more realistically, one might also expect there to be some
nonsalvageable sunk costs, the recovery of which would be forfeited if the
defendant had to demolish portions of the building to access the plumbing, and
that the holdup royalty would reflect some portion of these costs as well. Cf. supra
note 106 (noting that our Riles example abstracts away from potential redesign
costs). The broader point is that, while intuition supports the notion that sunk
costs are past costs and redesign costs are future costs, there may be no sharp
dividing line between what is a nonsalvageable sunk cost and what is a redesign
cost, when the process of redesign entails demolishing something that already has
been constructed.
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3. Forgone Benefits
The third component of patent holdup is perhaps most likely
to arise in cases involving SEPs or other patents exhibiting strong
network effects. To see how this third component by itself can
contribute to patent holdup, consider the following stylized
example. (We provide a more rigorous example in the Technical
Appendix.) Suppose that, ex ante, an SSO is choosing between two
standards, one of which incorporates (among other features) a
software-patented technology and the other a nonpatented
technology. The SSO adopts the first standard, even though the
patented technology at issue is no better than the nonpatented. (In
other words, 𝜋1 = 𝜋2 . ) For simplicity, suppose further that either
technology can be implemented by means of a costless firmware
update, so that 𝑘1 = 𝑘2 = 0. The ex ante royalty for the patented
technology therefore would be zero: ℱ 𝐴 = 𝜋1 − 𝑘1 − [𝜋2 − 𝑘2 ] =
𝜋1 − 𝜋2 = 0.
A non-SSO member implementer then inadvertently
infringes. Suppose further that the ex post cost of adopting the
nonpatented technology remains zero (that is, 𝑘2|1 = 𝑘2 = 0), but
that switching to that alternative ex post means that the
implementer will earn zero profit on devices that incorporate the
nonpatented technology, because those products will no longer
interoperate with other producers’ (that is, 𝜋2|1 = 0). The ex post
royalty therefore reduces to: ℱ 𝑃 = 𝜋1 − 𝜋2|1 = 𝜋1 , and the holdup
portion to ℋ = 𝑘1 + Δ𝜋2 + Δ𝑘2 = 𝜋2 .
Counterintuitively, then, what contributes to holdup in this
example is not the variable profit that is lost from not selling the
patented technology (𝜋1 ), but rather the diminution in the variable
profit attributable to the ex post use of the noninfringing
alternative (𝜋2 )—that is, the forgone benefit attributable to the
SSO not having chosen the nonpatented alternative ex ante.
To be sure, in the above example we assumed that 𝜋1 = 𝜋2 , so
the variable profit that the implementer loses from not selling the
patented technology (𝜋1 ) is the same amount as the diminution in
the variable profit attributable to the ex post use of the
noninfringing alternative (𝜋2 ). But this will not always be the case.
Suppose instead that the SSO chose the first standard because the
patented technology really is superior to the nonpatented
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alternative, that is, that ℱ 𝐴 = 𝜋1 − 𝑘1 − [𝜋2 − 𝑘2 ] = 𝜋1 − 𝜋2 > 0.
The ex post royalty will still be ℱ 𝑃 = 𝜋1 − 𝜋2|1 = 𝜋1 , and the holdup
portion will still be ℋ = 𝑘1 + Δ𝜋2 + Δ𝑘2 = 0 + 𝜋2 + 0 = 𝜋2 . In this
case, however, only part of the ex post royalty is attributable to
holdup; the other part reflects the ex ante value of the technology
(𝜋1 − 𝜋2 ).
4. Injunctions and “Lag Time”
Another variation on this theme involves “lag time” and
injunctive relief. In their paper Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro provide a model in which
holdup can arise because an injunction, if enforced, would result in
a period of time during which the implementer is unable to sell
anything, pending the development of a noninfringing product.115
This is very similar to the case of redesign costs, but rather than
being a fixed cost, the lag time results in forgone variable profits.116
To see why, we can normalize a product’s lifespan to 1, and let
𝜆 denote the length of the lag period (0 < 𝜆 < 1), expressed as a
portion of the product lifetime. Then, as a result of ex ante adoption
of technology 1, the lifetime profits from a product utilizing
technology 2 fall from 𝜋2 to 𝜋2|1 = (1 − 𝜆)𝜋2 . Ignoring fixed costs,
lag time in technology-switching generates holdup rents of
ℋ = 𝜆𝜋2. Intuitively, although most patented technologies
contribute only incrementally to a final product, an injunction is
usually not an incremental remedy: it typically requires the
defendant to withdraw the entire product for some amount of time,
even if only a small component is infringing.117
What unifies all these examples is that the holdup comprises
an opportunity cost of not having chosen the alternative technology
ex ante.118 The differential profit in this example parallels the
115. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 1997, 2038 (providing an
example of holdup due to an injunction).
116. Id.
117. See supra Part II.A.
118. Indeed, one could readily consider the (negative) ex post benefit of
switching to an alternative as a (positive) ex post switching cost, though we think
it is somewhat more intuitive to distinguish the redesign costs from forgone
benefits, as above. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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differential cost in the example of the plumbing valves. What
matters is not the cost (or diminished profit) of adopting technology
2, but the difference between that forward-looking cost (or profit)
and the cost (or profit) that would have been incurred had
technology 2 been adopted in the first place. When the two
technologies are roughly equivalent, the difference will be small,
and most of the forward-looking penalty from switching will indeed
contribute to holdup. But when technology 1 is superior, some
substantial part of the forward-looking costs, or lost profits, will
represent the true value of the technology, not holdup. And
forward-looking costs are not necessary to holdup at all. The sunk
costs of adopting technology 1 that contribute to holdup are also a
consequence of not having chosen technology 2 in the first place,
which would have avoided those sunk costs, and consequently they
contribute to holdup in any event.
5. More Complex Cases
The foregoing examples were intended to isolate, as much as
possible, the three different sources of holdup we have identified,
but real-world fact patterns will more typically present two or even
all three of the potential sources of patent holdup, at least to some
degree. Consider, for example, a typical case brought by a patent
assertion entity (PAE). Most commonly, PAEs assert software or
business method related patents that cover technologies
incorporated into complex devices that integrate many
complementary features.119 This fact alone can make the process
of redesigning the device ex post more complicated than it would
have been ex ante, insofar as a switch would entail not only losing
one’s sunk investment in the infringing technology, but also (as in
the plumbing example) incurring the cost of uninstalling much of
what already has been done. In addition, PAEs rarely transfer
119. See FTC STUDY, supra note 2, at 5, 74–75, 135 (“Of all the patents held
by PAEs in the FTC’s study, 88% fell under the Computers & Communications or
Other Electrical & Electronic technology categories, and more than 75% of the
Study PAEs’ overall holdings were software-related patents.”); Brian J. Love et
al., An Empirical Look at the “Brokered” Market for Patents, 83 MO. L. REV. 359,
399–406 (2018) (“[L]ooking closer at the technology categories for which we did
see a large number of packages, software stands out as the most interesting.”).
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technical know-how to their targets, preferring instead to target
firms that have independently invented the allegedly infringing
technology,120 thus creating a risk of ex ante opportunism. On the
other hand, PAE cases that are litigated to judgment in the United
States rarely result in the entry of an injunction,121 and so the risk
of enabling the owner to extract a royalty reflecting the differential
cost of adopting the alternative is mitigated. Courts in the U.S.
would still need to ensure, however, that the royalties awarded do
not reflect this cost or, as above, the infringer’s sunk cost.
SEP cases also can present enormous differential ex post
redesign costs, unlike our stylized example in the preceding
subsection. If a firm is found to have infringed an SEP and is
subject to an injunction, it faces a choice among (1) abandoning the
project entirely (and thus forfeiting its sunk costs, as above); (2)
switching to a noninfringing alternative; or (3) paying what the
SEP owner demands. Often, switching will entail having to
redesign many complementary features, even if there is some
alternative standard available to switch to—and, as discussed in
the preceding subsection, the benefits to be derived from employing
that alternative also are likely to be much lower ex post than they
would have been had the alternate been chosen (by the infringer
and others) ex ante. Another possibility is that the infringer could
convince all or most of the other firms that implement the patented
technology to switch to an alternative standard, but the ex post cost
of such an en masse switch would surely exceed the ex ante cost of
adopting the alternative in the first place.122

120. See COTTER, supra note 1, at 211–12, 215–16; Love et al., supra note 119,
at 404–05 (finding that the brokered patent market is a market for the transfer
of potential legal liability, not for the transfer of technology).
121. See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation
After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949 (2016) (noting that PAE
cases brought in the United States rarely result in an injunction). Prior to the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006), courts almost always granted the prevailing patent owner an injunction.
The pre-eBay standard of near-automatic injunctive relief largely remains the
rule outside the United States, except in SEP cases. For discussion, see, for
example, Contreras et al., supra note 6, at 175–84 (discussing the law regarding
injunctions in the European Union); Siebrasse et al., Injunctive Relief, supra note
7, at 134– 41 (discussing the law regarding injunctions in England).
122. See Carlton & Shampine, supra note 74, at 542 (presenting a situation
in which the ex post cost exceeds the ex ante costs of adopting an alternative).
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Similarly, a phenomenon known as “patent ambush” provides
another example of how sunk costs, as well as potentially the other
two costs, can contribute to holdup.123 Patent ambush can arise
when, for example, an SSO member induces other members into
adopting a standard that (unbeknownst to the other members) is
or will be infringed by the member’s patents, and then once those
other members are locked in demands an ex post royalty that
exceeds the patent’s ex ante value.124 Revising the standard ex post
would result in a waste of, at the least, much of the time and effort
that went into developing the standard ex ante, and thus we would
expect 𝑘1 to be substantial.125 In addition, however, since the
technology is standardized, it is likely that the ex post costs of
shifting to an alternative also would be higher than the ex ante
costs of doing so, and that the ex post benefits any single firm would
derive from unilaterally switching would be lower than the ex ante
benefits had an alternative standard been chosen.126
6. Further Observations
The foregoing analysis identifies the kinds of costs that are
relevant to holdup. While the problem of sunk costs has long been
well understood, we have argued that switching costs, in the
intuitive sense of what it would cost to switch to the alternative
technology, are not relevant in themselves. Instead, what is
relevant is the differential switching cost—how much more would
it have cost to switch than it would have cost to implement the
alternative. Similarly, the question is not how much less profit the
infringer would make if it had to switch to an alternative, but how
much less it would make compared with what it would have made
had it adopted the alternative initially. While our analysis has
123. Cotter, supra note 11, at 1188–89.
124. Id.
125. Most observers agree that when such conduct occurs the deceived
members are entitled to some form of legal redress, though opinions differ as to
whether the optimal legal response lies in antitrust, contract, or—by denying
injunctive relief, or possibly withholding any form of relief under the doctrine of
equitable estoppel—patent law itself. Id. at 1188–1200.
126. Id.
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aimed to clear up some conceptual fuzziness, it also has practical
implications. For example, many authors have suggested that the
availability of injunctive relief should be conditioned, at least in
part, on the potential for holdup if the injunction is granted.127 A
prior question, then, is whether there is a potential for holdup on
the facts of the case. Our analysis implies that determining the
holdup risk does not always amount to simply asking whether the
cost of switching would be high, as a naïve understanding of
“switching costs” might imply. Instead, it is the differential costs
which are relevant.
To be sure, there may be practical problems in implementing
this analysis, assuming it is persuasive. Our analysis does imply
that more information is needed to assess holdup than under a
model which simply looks at forward-looking switching costs, for
example; and it might be difficult for courts to determine the
values of the relevant variables in some cases. But if our analysis
is right, it would not make sense for a court to assess holdup by
taking into account only forward-looking switching costs, simply
because it does not have the evidence to determine the differential
switching costs. The better approach would be for the court to
recognize that it does not actually know the potential for holdup
when deciding whether an injunction should be granted. Further,
it may not always be so difficult to obtain the information needed
to determine whether a holdup risk is present: all that is necessary
is some basis for concluding that the ex post cost of adopting the
alternative is substantially greater than the ex ante cost, without
necessarily quantifying either.
Similarly, in the redesign with lag time case presented above,
all that would be necessary is some way of ascertaining how long
an injunction would result in the defendant being excluded from
the market, and some rough estimate of the ex ante profit the
defendant would have expected to earn had it employed the
alternative initially. The greater these two variables are, the
greater the risk of holdup. On the other hand, to the extent that a
court would insist on quantitative evidence of the holdup costs, the
additional evidence required by our approach might be easy to
127.

See supra note 11 and accompanying text (gathering sources).
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obtain. If a party were able to submit specific evidence of how much
it would cost to implement an alternative technology, it should not
be too difficult also to provide evidence as to how much it would
have cost to have implemented it initially. Moreover, courts can
only deal with the evidence before them, and our analysis gives the
parties an incentive to produce the right kind of evidence. If an
infringer argues in its pleadings that an injunction should be
denied because of high costs to switch to the alternative, our
analysis suggests that the patentee should bring forth evidence
that the costs would have been just as high ex ante (assuming, of
course, that that is true).
Finally, we note that, although redesign costs as such are
irrelevant to holdup, it is possible that in some cases they would
be of approximately the same magnitude as the cost already sunk
in the patented technology. In such a case, redesign costs could
serve as a proxy for sunk costs, if the latter are (for reasons
suggested in the preceding section) difficult to determine but it is
reasonable to believe that the sunk cost of adopting either
technology would be roughly equal. Of course, whether redesign
and sunk costs actually are roughly equal is an empirical matter
that likely would vary from case to case.
IV. Some Possible Critiques
Although many observers have found the economic analysis of
patent holdup as developed by Shapiro and others persuasive, a
distinct minority of observers (including the new head of the DOJ’s
Antitrust Division) has expressed serious reservations over both
the theory and its relevance in addressing real-world problems.128
The critiques generally fall into three categories: first, that the
theory presents an illogical extension of classic holdup theory;
second, that patent holdup cannot be a real-world phenomenon,
because the industries that one might expect to have been most
affected by it (e.g., smartphones) are among the most innovative in
128. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (citing speeches made by Makan
Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, in which he critiqued
courts’ reluctance to grant injunctions in SEP cases).
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all of human history; and third, that a practice known as “reverse
holdup” or “holdout,” which occurs when implementers negotiate
in bad faith for the right to use patented technologies, is a form of
opportunism that merits greater concern than patent holdup. To
the extent some or all of these claims are based on empirical
assertions about the frequency with which holdup occurs (or not)
in the real world, our analysis neither proves nor disproves them.
We think it does show, however, that there is nothing logically
unsound about the patent holdup concept. Moreover, because any
of the three components of patent holdup can exist independently
of the others, the conditions that enable holdup can arise in a
number of commonplace settings; holdup, in other words, does not
have to devastate an entire industry to be a matter of appropriate
concern. In addition, we will show that there is nothing unusual
about taking holdup considerations into account in crafting
intellectual property (IP) rules and standards, but rather that
several other doctrines in patent and other IP law can be viewed
as means for preventing the opportunistic exploitation of IP rights.
A. Is Patent Holdup Really Holdup?
As our discussion throughout has indicated, other
commentators have explored a wide variety of circumstances in
which holdup can occur. The analysis presented in Parts II and III
shows that the general principle linking all of these examples is
the path dependence that arises when an implementer changes its
position after having adopted a patented technology without first
having come to terms with the patent owners. The resulting holdup
rent that the patent owner can extract can then be broken down
into the sum of the implementer’s sunk costs plus the opportunity
cost of not having chosen the next-best nonpatented technology ex
ante. As we also noted above, however, this type of situation is not
identical to the descriptions of holdup found in the classic holdup
literature, which typically models one party to an incomplete
contract
extracting
ex
post
concessions
from
the
other—concessions that are unanticipated ex ante, due to the
party’s “guile” in concealing its true intentions.129 Patent holdup
129.

See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
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skeptics sometimes argue that, because patent holdup does not fit
the classic pattern, there is something wrong with patent holdup
theory.130
We disagree. Both the classic and the patent holdup literature
demonstrate how a party that finds itself locked in, based on some
initial, not easily reversible choice, can become vulnerable to
another’s ability to leverage the extraction of quasi-rents ex post.131
Moreover, while some analysts emphasize guile as a necessary
condition for classic holdup, not all of them do; and in the settings
of relevance to patent holdup, the fact that implementers
sometimes can anticipate the risk of being held up hardly
eliminates the harm to static and dynamic efficiency if and when
patent holders extract royalties that exceed the value of their
inventions.132 Indeed, even Galetovic and Haber appear, perhaps
inadvertently, to concede the point.133 As noted above, in their
discussion of patent holdup’s alleged inconsistencies with classic
holdup, they argue that implementers know they bear the risk of
inadvertently trespassing on patents, and thus can “either insure
themselves against that risk (by setting aside a reserve) or demand
a higher expected return on capital, as with any other business
risk.”134 Either response, however, increases the cost of investing
in a holdup-prone industry, and thus inefficiently diverts resources
to other areas with a lower social rate of return but less holdup
risk.135 This consequence is precisely why patent holdup reduces
social welfare.136
Finally, while Galetovic and Haber argue that, in an otherwise
perfectly competitive market, one party’s extraction of quasi-rents
cannot be a long-term equilibrium because the other party will be
unable to cover its fixed costs and thus eventually will go out of
business,137 that theoretical observation hardly eliminates the
130. See, e.g., Galetovic & Haber, supra note 78, at 13–28.
131. See, e.g., Klein et. al, supra note 13, at 299–300 (discussing opportunistic
leverage of quasi-rents).
132. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
133. Galetovic & Haber, supra note 78, at 27.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
137. Galetovic & Haber, supra note 78, at 28.
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possibility that holdup can occur, in the short run, in real-world,
imperfectly competitive markets.138 We doubt that Shell would
have gone out of business, for example, even if Riles had been able
to extract an unwarranted $84 million royalty on one occasion, but
that does not mean that courts should turn a blind eye to the
potential for such abuses in real cases. More generally, one cannot
credibly claim to have “disproven” the validity of patent holdup as
a general concept by imposing strong assumptions on market
structure (namely that it is perfectly competitive) serving
effectively to guarantee that holdup would not be a viable means
of extracting revenues.
B. Patent Holdup Is Not a Problem, Because It Is Not Systemic
A second, related argument is that there is no empirical
evidence of patent owners engaging in pervasive, systemic patent
holdup in the very industries holdup theorists are most concerned
with (e.g., telecommunications).139 Indeed, according to the critics,
if holdup were pervasive one would expect innovation and growth
in the affected industries to “stagnate, wither, or die,”140 whereas
if one looks “across human history, it is not clear that the
commercialization of complex technologies has ever been faster
than it is today in those industries that reform proponents point to
as most plagued by the patent holdup ‘problem.’”141
138. Id.
139. For citations to sources making this claim, see Jorge L. Contreras, Much
Ado About Hold-Up, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 878 n.10 (2019); J. Gregory Sidak,
The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents, 104 GEO. L.J.
ONLINE 48, 61 n.49 (2015); Putnam, supra note 74, at 1004.
140. Galetovic & Haber, supra note 78, at 28.
141. Alexander Galetovic et al., Patent Holdup: Do Patent Holders Holdup
Innovation?, HOOVER IP2 WORKING PAPER SERIES, May 2014, at 1, 6. See also
Alexander Galetovic et al., An Empirical Examination of Patent Holdup, 11 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549, 572 (2015) [hereinafter Empirical Examination]
(concluding that “the rate of innovation—as reflected in quality adjusted relative
prices—has rarely, if ever, been faster than it is today in exactly those products
that scholars agree are theoretically subject to SEP holdup”); David J. Kappos,
The *Real* Innovation Economy—Debunking Myths at the Intersection Between
Intellectual Property and Competition Laws, https://perma.cc/C6HT-UL8B (PDF)
(“Mythtellers would have us believe that patent owners are wielding SEPs
offensively to hold up standards implementers . . . . But if this were the case,
the cost of popular consumer technology would not be plummeting while new
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Although we agree that whether, or to what extent, patent
holdup occurs in the real world is ultimately an empirical matter,
the implication that patent holdup is a problem only if it is
“pervasive” or “systemic” is a non sequitur.142 If our analysis above
is correct—that the ability to engage in patent holdup depends on
path dependence, that settings conducive to patent holdup are not
uncommon, and that the three components of a holdup royalty can
exist independently of one another—patent holdup does not have
to be systemic to be capable of reducing social welfare. Seeing how
the empirical critiques of patent holdup do “not claim[ ] that
individual firms never attempt to engage in behavior that can be
characterized as holdup,”143 the conclusion that holdup is not
systemic may well be accurate, for all we know, while still being of
any limited relevance for purposes of determining whether
injunctive relief should issue on the facts of any one particular
case.144 If the choice were between always granting an injunction
without tailoring or conditions, and never granting any form of
injunctive relief, perhaps the question of whether holdup was
systemic, at least in a particular industry, would be central. But
the traditional approach to injunctive relief looks to the facts of the
particular case.145
features simultaneously spring up with equal fervor.”); Putnam, supra note 74, at
967:
Despite having launched arguably the most successful consumer
product in history, Apple even claims to have ‘faced excessive royalty
demands, onerous contract terms and the threat of injunctions barring
the sale of a revolutionary new product,’ ‘a history . . . [that] has left
[the FRAND licensing] promise at least partially unfulfilled.’ . . . Faced
with these economic headwinds, Apple has sold just 1.2 billion iPhones
in 10 years, worth $738 billion. (citations omitted).
142. See Galetovic et al., Empirical Examination, supra note 141, at 555
(“[W]e are not claiming that individual firms never attempt to engage in behavior
that can be characterized as holdup. Rather, we do not find evidence consistent
with the hypothesis that SEP holdup is a systemic problem.”).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)
(providing that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate irreparable
injury; that other damages available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate; that a remedy in equity is warranted; and the public interest would
not be disserved by a permanent injunction).
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Further, rather than the absence of patent holdup serving as
a reason for courts to enter injunctions in SEP, PAE, and other
cases, it may be that case law imposing limits on the entry of
injunctions is itself a leading factor constraining firms from
engaging in holdup.146 Again, the question ultimately is an
empirical one, but for now we cannot rule out the possibility that
legal reforms were necessary to prevent patent holdup from getting
worse.
C. Holdout Is Worse Than Holdup
A third argument is that, because the patent owner has
incurred ex ante sunk costs in the research and development that
resulted in a patented invention, the owner is subject to a form of
ex post opportunism (“holdout”) on the part of implementers who
refuse to pay fair compensation; and that this opportunism is, if
anything, more insidious than patent holdup, because absent a fair
reward the incentive to engage in innovation withers away.147
Implicit in this argument are two related points that need to be
unpackaged: first, that holdout is itself a form of holdup; and
second, that holdout should be of more concern than holdup to
courts and other decision makers.
146. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text (citing the Supreme Court’s
2006 decision providing four factors which courts should consider before
determining to grant injunctive relief to patent owners and providing sources
which survey relevant case law).
147. See, e.g., Delrahim, The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and
Intellectual Property Law, supra note 9, at 5 (arguing that, as a premise of the
“New Madison” approach, “standard setting organizations should not become
vehicles for concerted actions by market participants to skew conditions for
patented technologies’ incorporation into a standard in favor of implementers
because this can reduce incentives to innovate and encourage patent hold-out”);
Richard A. Epstein et al., The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up
Replacing Private Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 26–27 (2012)
(noting that the “combined effect” of the FTC’s prescriptions for when parties
infringe would lead to an “inevitable slippage in the damage system”); F. Scott
Kieff & Anne Layne-Farrar, Incentive Effects From Different Approaches to
Holdup Mitigation Surrounding Patent Remedies and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1091, 1113 (2013) (“[I]nterpreting a
RAND commitment as preventing patent holders from ever seeking an
injunction” would allow infringers “to rationally consider the benefits of simply
avoiding any up-front offer to take a license on any terms . . . .”).
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Commentators who express the view that holdout is a form of
holdup base their argument on the fact that, in the
standard-setting world in particular, firms compete to have their
technologies included in a standard, knowing full well that only
one of them will emerge victorious.148 In such a winner-take-all
market, the firm that prevails must receive an adequate return on
its ex ante investment149 in order to maintain the incentive for itself
and other firms to participate in future competitions. Ex post,
however, implementers can resort to delay and other tactics to
resist paying adequate compensation.150 On this telling, it is the
technology owners whose irreversible, ex ante, sunk-cost
investments have made them vulnerable to ex post
appropriation.151
148. See, e.g., Putnam, supra note 74, at 977 (“[S]tandardization is a
winner-take-all process, in which—unlike market competition—there can be only
one winner, by definition.”); Delrahim, The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust
and Intellectual Property Law, supra note 9, at 8 (“If an inventor participates in
a standard setting process and wins support for including a patented technology
in a standard, that decision does not magically transform a lawful patent right
into an unlawful monopoly.”).
149. Actually, Putnam argues that in a winner-take-all market, adequate
compensation must account for the ex ante probability that the firm would not
prevail, since otherwise the industry-wide incentive will be too low. Putnam,
supra note 74, at 980–81. Putnam’s insight is similar in some respects to a
critique two of us have made to the Baumol & Swanson auction model, but the
resolution of these issues goes beyond the scope of this Article.
150. See Putnam, supra note 74, at 971 (“Just as innovators can hold up
implementers by demanding a price that is ‘too high’ ex post, implementers can
hold up innovators by demanding a price that is ‘too low’ ex post.”).
151. Id. Note that Putnam is not arguing that firms are entitled to
compensation simply because they have engaged in ex ante R&D. That would be
a bad argument, since all a patent ever conveys is an opportunity to recoup, but
if the market decides the invention has little or no commercial value the firm has
no choice but to write off the R&D as a loss. Patents, in other words, reward
success (building a better mousetrap, one that consumers want to buy), not effort
(building a mousetrap that is no better than what is already on the market); and
most analysts, including us, view this as a feature, not a bug. See, e.g., Melamed
& Shapiro, supra note 85, at 2118–20; Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 82, at
1190–91. Nor do we understand him to be arguing that implementers are always
wrong to resist patentees’ demands. Empirical evidence indicates that over forty
percent of patents litigated to judgment are invalidated in whole or in part, and
that patentees overall win only about twenty-five percent of all cases litigated to
judgment. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., How Often Do Non-Practicing Entities
Win Patent Suits?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 237, 269 (2017) (reporting, based on

1550

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 (2019)

At a high level, we acknowledge the parallel. Above, we
defined holdup to be the ability of patent owners to extract
royalties that exceed the ex ante baseline, because of sunk costs
and opportunity costs incurred by the implementer.152 The
converse argument is that holdout allows patent users to pay
royalties that are less than the ex ante baseline, because of sunk
costs incurred by the patentee. At a more specific level, however,
the analogy breaks down. In particular, it is often argued that
denying injunctive relief is necessary to prevent holdup; the
converse argument is that granting injunctive relief is necessary
to prevent holdout.153
Here we disagree: that the problems of holdup and holdout are
roughly analogous does not mean that the solutions must be
analogous. Unlike the patent owner, who (if armed with an
injunction) can force the implementer to switch or abandon the
market altogether if the implementer is unwilling to agree to the
owner’s terms, implementers cannot simply refuse to deal with
patent owners once they have begun using technologies covered by
valid patents; at the very least, they would be liable for damages
incurred through the date of judgment.154 Moreover, if they have
an analysis of all patent infringement actions filed in federal district court in
2008–09, that “[t]he overall definitive patentee win rate in our data set for cases
that went to a final judgment is 25.8%. This is consistent with prior work showing
that patentees win approximately a quarter of their cases”); John R. Allison et al.,
Our Divided Patent System, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1099–1100, 1124–26 (2015)
(reporting, based on the same data set, an overall invalidation rate of 42.6% for
all patents litigated to judgment); Mark A. Lemley & Timothy Simcoe, How
Essential Are Standard-Essential Patents?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 607, 608 (2019)
(finding that SEPs litigated to judgment are more likely to be valid, but
(surprisingly) less likely to be infringed, than other patents). Invalidation and win
rates in other countries are roughly comparable. For discussion, see THOMAS F.
COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(2013).
152. See supra Part II.C.
153. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
154. The statement in the text may be a bit of an exaggeration. One could
imagine a situation in which a powerful implementer simply does refuse to pay a
patent owner whose lack of funds renders its ability to sustain an infringement
suit illusory. Of course, if the patentee cannot afford to litigate at all, it does not
matter whether the remedy is an injunction or not; but perhaps in some case a
threat of injunctive relief would reduce the chance that the implementer would
refuse to deal, because if the patentee did go to court, the implementer’s exposure
would be greater. We concede that under this set of circumstances, it may be

DEMYSTIFYING PATENT HOLDUP

1551

engaged in bad-faith behavior, for example, by dragging out
negotiations for no reason other than to wear down the patent
owner or gain some other advantage from delay, they make
themselves vulnerable to a variety of additional sanctions. As
Jorge Contreras notes, in such instances holdout “is simply willful
patent infringement,”155 which in the U.S. can result in the
imposition of enhanced (up to treble) damages156 and attorneys’
fees.157 (To be fair, though, such consequences are not guaranteed.)
Another possibility, in countries other than the United States,
is that a court could award the infringer’s profits, which typically
will exceed a reasonable or FRAND royalty.158 There also appears
to be a general consensus, both in the U.S. and abroad, that even
if a risk of patent holdup generally weighs against the imposition
of injunctive relief, an injunction—and whatever leverage follows
from its entry—may be appropriate when the implementer refuses
to bargain in good faith.159 Finally, if multiple implementers form
appropriate to consider the implementer as engaging in a form of opportunistic
holdup by refusing to deal.
155. Contreras, supra note 139, at 895.
156. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1930 (2016)
(“This Court accordingly described § 284—consistent with the history of enhanced
damages under the Patent Act—as providing that ‘punitive or “increased”
damages’ could be recovered ‘in a case of willful or bad-faith infringement.’”)
(citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 508
(1964)).
157. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545,
553–54 (2014) (noting that district courts have discretion to award attorney’s fees
for “exceptional” cases in patent litigation).
158. See Contreras et al., supra note 6, at 167–68, 191–92, 197–200 (providing
examples of foreign jurisdictions awarding damages in excess of a FRAND
royalty).
159. See, e.g., Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs. Co. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.J.,
¶¶ 65, 71, https://perma.cc/5FYZ-DBA6 (last visited Nov. 3, 2019) (ruling that an
SEP holder may only be found in breach of competition rules when it seeks an
injunction against a potential licensee in certain circumstances); JAPAN PATENT
OFFICE, GUIDE TO LICENSING NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING STANDARD ESSENTIAL
PATENTS 21 (2018), https://perma.cc/Q6YB-5SFU (PDF) (“Most courts have
imposed limitations on . . . injunction[s] against implementers who have
responded in good faith, and have determined that it would be appropriate for a
rights holder . . . to seek an injunction when implementers have responded in bad
faith during the negotiation process.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL
PATENTS
SUBJECT
TO
VOLUNTARY
F/RAND
COMMITMENTS
(2013),
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an agreement to limit the royalties they will offer to SEP holders
(which may be tantamount to a “buyer cartel”), then antitrust
provides a potential means of attacking the holdout problem.160
That said, it remains possible that delay could result in harms
that would not be fully remedied by such measures, if for example
court-awarded damages are systematically under compensatory161
or if legal doctrine declines to view certain harms as
non-compensable.162 This gets to the second point, that regardless
of whether it makes sense to think of holdout as a form of holdup,
it is a type of behavior that threatens the long-term health of the
patent system and that policymakers therefore should not ignore.
To that extent, we agree. Moreover, it is certainly possible that, as
an empirical matter, the harms resulting from holdout outweigh
the harms resulting from holdup, either in a particular case or
industry, or in general.163 In the absence of empirical evidence,
https://perma.cc/DF9S-ABW3 (describing appropriate determination of remedies
in relation to patents bound by FRAND commitments); Motorola Mobility L.L.C.,
F.T.C., No. C-4410 (2013); Bosch GmbH, F.T.C., No. C-44377 (2012); Yabing Cui,
Across the Fault Lines: Chinese Judicial Approaches to Injunctions and SEP’s,
CHINA IPR (June 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/V5LF-8YQP (last visited Nov. 3, 2019)
(discussing the approach recently articulated in Chinese legal sources) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
160. For a discussion on this topic, see Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Cartels
Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust
Policy, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2010).
161. As they are sometimes asserted to be, see, Einer Elhauge, Do Patent
Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?, 4 J.
COMP. L. & ECON. 535, 557 (2008), though we’re not convinced this is so, see
Cotter, supra note 11, at 175, n.52.
162. In the U.S., for example, courts routinely award prejudgment interest
and have discretion to compound it, but in many countries interest itself is
discretionary or, if awarded, is not (or is rarely) compounded. For discussion, see
Colleen V. Chien et al., Enhanced Damages, Litigation Cost Recovery, and
Interest, in COMPLEX PRODUCTS, supra note 6, at 90, 111–14.
163. Arguably, the first-best response to holdout behavior enabled by
deficiencies in the law of damages (e.g., refusing to award compound interest)
would be to reform the law of damages. Until that happens, however, it probably
is sensible for courts to take holdout risks into account when determining whether
to grant injunctions. Moreover, if courts too readily deny injunctions,
implementers may have an incentive to forgo voluntary bargaining even when
such bargaining would be possible, the result being an increase in the error and
adjudication costs that property rules avoid. Just because a risk of holdup may
exist in a given case does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that courts should
automatically refuse injunctions, to the detriment of all other considerations. See
generally Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan B. Noroozi, Why Incentives for Patent
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however, it would be foolish to ignore the risks of holdup just
because the risks of holdout could be worse.
To repeat ourselves, if we are correct in concluding that the
ability to engage in patent holdup depends on path dependence,
that situations that are conducive to patent holdup are common,
and that the three components of a holdup royalty can exist
independently of one another, the risk of holdout provides no
warrant for ignoring the risks of holdup, or vice versa. Put another
way, even if one views holdout as a form of holdup, the question
posed in any given case is whether one or the other or both are
present; and if so, what remedy is appropriate to minimize the net
harm. Injunctive relief may be an appropriate tool for fending off
holdout in a given case, but it is not necessarily the best or only
tool, depending on the circumstances; and in any event, courts
should be aware of the risks resulting from both forms of behavior.
D. Other IP Doctrines That Mitigate Holdup Risks
Finally, although the point is not directly responsive to any of
the above critiques, we would argue that several doctrines within
IP law can be viewed as tools for reducing the risk of holdup under
certain discrete circumstances, a fact that few observers up until
now have explicitly noted. Note that we are not claiming that the
reduction of holdup risk was a primary or even conscious goal of
the courts and legislatures that developed these doctrines. Rather,
we claim that, just as it sometimes argued (and disputed) that the
common law evolved in a manner that tended to promote the goal
of economic efficiency,164 several doctrines in IP law can be
interpreted as reducing holdup risks, albeit sometimes only
imperfectly or secondarily to their main purpose.
Most obvious, perhaps, are the various equitable defenses and
doctrines that arise in IP (particularly patent) litigation. For
example, the doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes the patent

Holdout Threaten to Dismantle FRAND, and Why It Matters,
32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381 (2017).
164. For a brief overview of the efficient common law hypothesis, see, for
example, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 8.1 (9th ed. 2014).
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owner from asserting what otherwise would be a valid claim of
patent infringement if:
(1) “[t]he patentee, through misleading conduct, leads the
alleged infringer to reasonably infer that the patentee does not
intend to enforce its patent against the alleged infringer,” (2) “[t]he
alleged infringer relies on that conduct,” and (3) “[d]ue to its
reliance, the alleged infringer will be materially prejudiced if the
patentee is allowed to proceed with its claim.”165
By validating the defendant’s reasonable reliance on the
owner’s implicit representation that it would not enforce its patent,
the doctrine prevents the owner from extracting a holdup royalty
ex post; and courts have applied the doctrine to, among other
matters, cases involving patent ambush, which as discussed
above166 occurs when a firm misleads other members of an SSO
into incorporating the firm’s patented technology into a technical
standard.167 Other equitable doctrines that frequently come up in
patent litigation—including laches,168 prosecution laches,169
prosecution history estoppel,170 and the disclosure dedication
rule171—play a similar role in backing up the implementer’s
165. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc), abrogated in part on other grounds by SCA Hygiene
Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017).
166. See supra note 123–125 and accompanying text.
167. See Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1021–24 n.8 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (noting that equitable estoppel may generally be an appropriate legal
framework for analysis of breaches of disclosure duties in the SSO context).
168. See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 667 (2014)
(holding that laches—“unreasonable, prejudicial delay in commencing suit”—do
not bar a copyright owner’s claim for damages brought within the statute of
limitations, but may preclude equitable relief); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag,
137 S. Ct. at 959 (extending Petrella to patent law).
169. See Cancer Research Tech. Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 625 F.3d 724, 728–32
(Fed Cir. 2010) (holding that a patent may be rendered unenforceable if the patent
owner engaged in unreasonable, unexplained, prejudicial delay in prosecution).
170. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
727 (2002):
[W]hen the patentee responds to the rejection by narrowing his claims,
this prosecution history estops him from later arguing that the subject
matter covered by the original, broader claim was nothing more than
an equivalent. Competitors may rely on the estoppel to ensure that
their own devices will not be found to infringe by equivalence.
171. See PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[I]f one of ordinary skill in the art can understand the unclaimed
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reasonable belief that it is safe to proceed with its product launch,
and thus in forestalling holdup. Further, patent and copyright law
offer protections to good-faith assignees or licensees of IP rights
who lack notice of an earlier assignee’s or licensee’s rights;172 and
U.S. bankruptcy law shields the licensee of an IP right from having
its license rejected by the trustee in bankruptcy, for the benefit of
creditors.173
Second, in a recent paper titled Trolls and Orphans, Tun-Jen
Chiang notes that owners of copyrighted “orphan works” can
engage in a form of holdup similar to what PAEs are able to achieve
when implementers are locked in to an ex ante technological
choice.174 Orphan works are works that were created or published
recently enough that they are, or at least may be, still subject to

disclosed teaching upon reading the written description, the alternative matter
disclosed has been dedicated to the public.”).
172. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2018):
An interest that constitutes an assignment, grant or conveyance shall
be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a
valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the
Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its date or
prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage.
See also 17 U.S.C. §§ 205(d), 205(e) (2018) (copyrights).
173. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2018) (“If the trustee rejects an executory contract
under which the debtor is a licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee
under such contract may elect . . . to retain its rights . . . under such
contract . . . .”); Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652,
1657 (2019) (holding that a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a trademark licensing
contract in bankruptcy does not deprive the licensee of its right to use the mark);
Jaffé v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that the
application of 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) was necessary to ensure the protection of
licensees under the foreign debtor’s United States patents); Anthony Duggan &
Norman Siebrasse, The Protection of Intellectual Property Licenses in Insolvency:
Lessons from the Nortel Case, 4 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 489 (2015) (comparing
and contrasting protections granted to IP licensees in the U.S. and Canada using
the bankruptcy-focused strategy developed in Nortel). These latter rules favoring
good-faith licensees potentially could provide an analogy for efforts to ensure that
FRAND commitments “run with the patent,” that is, are enforceable against a
subsequent assignee of a FRAND-committed patent. For discussion, see, for
example, Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent
Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231 (2014).
174. See Chiang, supra note 21, at 694 (”The orphan works problem occurs
when potential users of a work fear the later emergence of an undiscovered
copyright holder and therefore refrain from using the work.”).
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copyright protection.175 Because the copyright term today is so long
(consisting of the life of the author plus seventy years in many
countries, including the United States),176 it often can be difficult
to determine whether a work is still subject to copyright at all, and
if so who the owner is.177
As a result, contemporary writers, filmmakers, and other
creative artists who want to reproduce or adapt works that were
created several decades ago sometimes face a dilemma in deciding
whether to devote resources to tracking down the work’s copyright
status and current owners, risk liability, or abandon the proposed
use.178 If the owner were to enjoin the use once it was underway, it
would be able to extract a holdup royalty.179 Among the possible
solutions to this dilemma are for courts to award reasonable
royalties only, in the event of litigation.180 Alternatively, some
commentators argue that courts should excuse the use altogether
as a fair use, if the defendant has made reasonable (albeit
unsuccessful) ex ante efforts to find the owner,181 given that one of
the standard rationales of fair use is to prevent transaction costs
or other bargaining obstacles from derailing what would otherwise
be productive uses of copyrighted works.182
175. Id. at 697.
176. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2018). For other countries, see Wikipedia’s table of
copyright durations by country, which to our knowledge is both comprehensive
and accurate.
List of Countries’ Copyright
Lengths, WIKIPEDIA,
https://perma.cc/5UBZ-CL6B (last visited Nov. 3, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
177. See, e.g., REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (2006),
https://perma.cc/A99S-KD5X (PDF) (articulating possible solutions to the orphan
works problem).
178. Id. at 36.
179. Id. at 37.
180. Id.
181. See Jennifer M. Urban, How Fair Use Can Help Solve the Orphan Works
Problem, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379, 1397 (2012) (arguing that because the
true owners of “orphan” works are unlikely to publicly release them, allowing
their use through the fair use doctrine would “advance knowledge without
undermining markets for the works”); see also Chiang, supra note 21, at 696 n.15
(proposing other possible solutions); David R. Hansen et al., Solving the Orphan
Works Problem for the United States, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2013).
182. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600, 1614–15 (1982) (stating that “[a]n economic justification for depriving a
copyright owner of his market entitlement only exists when the possibility of
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A third example of how IP law engages with opportunism is
the exhaustion doctrine, some version of which to applies to
patents, copyrights, and trademarks.183 In the patent law context,
for example, although the owner of a valid patent generally has the
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling a product
incorporating the patented technology, once the owner authorizes
the sale or other transfer of ownership of the product to another
party, that party is free to use or dispose of that article as she sees
fit; put another way, once the patent owner authorizes the sale of
the patented article her right to control the further use or sale of
that specific article is exhausted.184 As Wenton Zheng observers,
the exhaustion doctrine prevents patent owners from engaging in
what we would describe as a form of classic holdup:
. . . [I]magine a world in which there is not a rule of patent
exhaustion, namely, a world in which a patentee is allowed to
impose restrictions on the use or resale of a patented article
without being required to inform the purchaser of the
restrictions at the time of the sale of the patented article. In
such a world, the purchaser faces an enormous amount of
uncertainty as to what restrictions might be imposed by the
patentee in the future[:] it could be a minor restriction that will
not substantially hinder the purchaser's use of the patented
article, or it could be a major restriction rendering the patented
article entirely useless. This uncertainty makes it very difficult,
if not impossible, for the purchaser to assess the value of the
patented article. It is conceivable that if the uncertainty
surrounding the rights that come with a purchase proves to be
too much to bear, some risk-averse purchasers may forego the
purchase altogether. Seen in this light, the doctrine of patent
exhaustion could be understood as a way of preventing the
seller from imposing after-the-fact restrictions so as to force the
purchaser and the seller to bargain over the value of the
patented article based on specific patent restrictions known to
the purchaser at the time of the purchase.185

consensual bargain has broken down in some way.”).
183. See, e.g., Impressions Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523,
1526 (2017) (holding that “[a] patentee's decision to sell a product exhausts all of
its patent rights in that item, regardless of any restrictions the patentee purports
to impose.”).
184. Id.
185. Wentong Zheng, Exhausting Patents, 63 UCLA L. REV. 122, 154 (2016)
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Framing the question in terms of opportunism and the parallel
with holdup is helpful in assessing the proper scope of exhaustion.
Because U.S. courts have interpreted the exhaustion doctrine to
apply even when the seller of the product embodying the IP right
puts the purchaser on notice of a post-sale restraint on subsequent
use or sale,186 the doctrine goes further than necessary to eliminate
holdup risks, which would not exist if the purchaser was on notice
ex ante.187
Finally, even patent law’s novelty requirement,188 which
prevents anyone from claiming exclusive rights in subject matter
that already is in the public domain, can be viewed as (in a sense)
reducing the risk of some forms of opportunistic behavior (even
though, as we again hasten to add, that is unlikely its principal or
intended purpose). One could imagine a different system, under
which (for example) a person who invests in commercializing an
underutilized technology189 or in proving its safety and
effectiveness,190 could acquire exclusive rights over that technology
(citations omitted).
186. See, e.g., Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1531, 1535 (“Once a patentee
decides to sell—whether on its own or through a licensee—that sale exhausts its
patent rights, regardless of any post-sale restrictions the patentee purports to
impose, either directly or through a license.”).
187. For an analysis of the aggregate welfare effects of the exhaustion
doctrine, see Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Trade and Tradeoffs:
The Case of International Patent Exhaustion, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 17
(2016).
188. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2018) (stating that “[a] person shall be
entitled to a patent unless . . . the claimed invention was patented, described in a
printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention”); In re Cruciferous Sprout
Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that a claimed invention lacks
novelty if it is necessarily present—“inherent”—in the prior art). Independent
invention nevertheless is not a defense against a claim of patent infringement,
one possible reason being that (in theory) the defendant could have discovered the
patent prior to launching its own product. A great deal of patent infringement
probably is the result of independent invention, however, see generally
Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 1421, 1451–57 (2009). Courts therefore still need to be careful in deciding
upon the correct remedy for such infringement in order to avoid holdup risks.
189. See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341
(2010) (discussing how “[d]ecoupling the invention and commercialization
functions of patent law” may substantially increase the commercialization of new
technology).
190. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of
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for a period of time. The patent system nevertheless prevents this
from happening, and in doing so it affords others the freedom to
access such subject matter without concern over being held up ex
post.191 On the other hand, if reducing holdup risks were the
Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 509–10 (2009). Note that someone who
develops a new use of an existing product can obtain a method patent on that
specific use, but not on the manufacture or other use of the product itself. See Arti
K. Rai & Grant Rice, Use Patents Can Be Useful: The Case of Rescued Drugs, 6
SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 248 (2014). Food and drug law, by contrast to patent
law, sometimes does confer exclusive marketing rights on firms that have
undertaken clinical studies of nonpatented drugs, in effect taking those drugs out
of the public domain for a period of time. As a result, the ex post price of such
drugs can increase substantially. For discussion, see COTTER, supra note 1, at
169–70 & n.125.
191. To be sure, one might argue in response that if a technology was not
being exploited ex ante, by definition there is no need to worry that exclusive
rights would result in anyone being held up ex post. Conferring a blanket
immunity on all uses of public domain subject matter nevertheless eliminates the
risk that others, who may have already begun working on new applications of old
inventions or who are unaware that the invention is no longer in the public
domain, will be subject to holdup. One can still argue whether the immunity is,
on balance, a wise response to what could be only a small risk of holdup, but our
point is simply that conventional novelty doctrine presents on example by which
conventional patent law forestalls a risk of ex post holdup.
Further to the point, a variety of other doctrines in copyright and
trademark law similarly function to keep public domain subject matter in the
public domain, and thus to reduce holdup risks. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–38 (2003) (stating, as a
general principle animating case law on preemption, functionality, and other IP
doctrines, that “[t]he right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a
copyright has expired, like ‘the right to make [an article whose patent has
expired]—including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when
patented—passes to the public’”) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 230 (1964)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3) (2018) (permitting a
“reliance party” to continue exploiting a derivative work based on a restored work
and created before the date of copyright restoration, if the reliance party pays
reasonable compensation where a copyright lapsed as a result of the author’s
noncompliance with copyright formalities, and has been restored pursuant to the
Copyright Restoration Act); id. § 203(b)(1) (permitting the continued utilization
of a derivative work prepared under authority of a grant of a transfer or license
of copyright, prior to the termination of that transfer under § 203(a), in accordance
with the terms of the grant); id. §§ 304(c)(6)(A), (d) (similar to § 203(b)(1), with
respect to transfers effected prior to January 1, 1978). On the other hand,
secondary liability doctrines such as contributory infringement sometimes enable
patent and copyright law to assert claims against persons who sell
non-IP-protected products that can be used to infringe patented or copyrighted
articles. The logic of such doctrines, however, is that without a claim for secondary
liability it sometimes would be impractical to enforce one’s rights in the protected
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primary concern, one might expect patent law to recognize
independent invention as a defense, something that (for a variety
of arguably valid reasons) it does not.192 The analogy only goes so
far.
V. Conclusion
Consistent with much of the economic and legal literature that
preceded it, the analysis presented in this Article demonstrates
that a holdup royalty can consist of three distinct components.
More specifically, when an implementer commits to a particular
technological path without clearing the necessary rights in
advance, a patent owner who can credibly threaten an injunction
can extract an ex post royalty that exceeds the ex ante baseline in
an amount up to the sum of the implementer’s sunk costs plus the
opportunity costs of not having chosen the next-best nonpatented
alternative ex ante. This latter cost in turn consists of both the
higher ex post costs of redesign—not the ex post costs of redesign
as such—if any, and the forgone benefits of not having chosen the
alternative
initially.
Moreover,
any
of
these
three
components—sunk costs, higher ex post redesign costs, and forgone
benefits—can exist independently of the others, though it may be
that all of them will be present to some degree in many instances,
and all three share a common origin in path dependence.
The aim of this paper has been to disentangle these sources of
holdup so that litigants and courts can better identify when holdup
may be a risk, and when it is not. This is a first step in answering
the ultimate question, such as whether an injunction should be
granted to a successful patentee, not a last step. Even when the
article itself. See Thomas F. Cotter, Four Questionable Rationales for the Patent
Misuse Doctrine, 12 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 457, 480–85 (2012) (noting this point,
and also discussing commentary suggesting that the doctrine of patent and
copyright misuse might work to prevent incursions upon the public domain).
192. See, e.g., COTTER, supra note 1, at 265 n.28 (2018) (“There are a variety
of arguably plausible reasons for not exempting inadvertent infringement, among
them that doing so might discourage firms from reading patents or increase the
costs of administering and adjudicating patent disputes.”). See also
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright and Good Faith Purchasers, 104 CAL. L.
REV. 269, 272 (2016) (noting that copyright law does not immunize the good-faith
purchaser of a copy incorporating a copyrighted work from liability for the
subsequent distribution of that copyrighted work).
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evidence indicates that a serious risk of holdup may be present, it
does not necessarily follow that courts should always deny an
injunction to the prevailing patent owner. To be sure, if and when
patent holdup occurs, it threatens substantial harms to static and
dynamic efficiency, for reasons discussed in Part II above. Given
the amount of money at stake in SEP cases in particular, the social
welfare loss in any given instance could amount to billions of
dollars. The questions are difficult, and ultimately empirical, ones.
We outline them here, not to take a position on them, but only to
emphasize that our analysis of the sources of holdup is only one
piece of the puzzle. Nonetheless, it is an important piece of the
puzzle. For example, if the costs of switching to a new technology
are very high, but the evidence shows that the costs of adopting it
would have been just as high ex ante, then our analysis suggests
(barring problems of sunk costs or differential profits), that the
question of whether to grant an injunction is easier than it might
seem.
Finally, each legal system must decide for itself how, if at all,
courts should address holdup risks. Some may decide that it’s best
to make case-by-case determinations (perhaps along the lines of
the examples in Part III.B), while others, conceivably, may
conclude that bright-line rules (e.g., no injunctions in PAE or SEP
cases absent proof of holdout) would conserve on adjudication costs
at a tolerable risk of error.193 Moreover, given the differences that
exist among individual countries’ legal systems and institutions,
nations must decide for themselves whether holdup risks, if they
are to be addressed at all, are best handled by the law of patent
remedies or contract, as in the U.S., or by competition law, the civil
law doctrine of abuse of right, or something else.194
193. In the U.S., the Supreme Court has warned against the use of bright
lines, or even presumptions, in applying eBay. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–95 (2006) (emphasizing “traditional equitable
principles” over “categorical rule[s]”). In other common law countries, by contrast,
there is usually a presumption in favor of injunctive relief, which the infringer
can try to rebut. See Siebrasse et al., supra note 7, at 154–55. On the pros and
cons of rules versus standards generally as applied to patent damages issues, see
Cotter, supra note 41.
194. See generally Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of
Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311
(2014) (discussing potential solutions to the patent holdup problem).
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However courts and other decision makers throughout the
world choose to address these matters, one thing is certain: before
crafting a legal response to an alleged problem, it’s good to know
exactly what the problem is. We hope this paper will enable
policymakers and their advisors to better understand what patent
holdup is, and will spur them to develop better methods for
detecting when a holdup threat is present—and when it’s not.
VI. Technical Appendix
We presented the basics of the model in the text, but here are
a couple of finer points.
Standards and Network Value
Many authors have highlighted the acute risk for holdup to
occur in the standard-setting context.195 The principal value of
standard-setting is that it helps to ensure interoperability among
a large number of complementary technologies. But, ex post, an
implementer enjoys this value only so long as it adheres to the
standard adopted ex ante. Our model makes it easy to see how this
creates a pervasive holdup threat (although we do not claim this is
the only thing that contributes to holdup in the standards
context).196
Suppose there is a positive mass 𝜂 of implementers, and let 𝜂𝑡
denote the measure of those that commit to technology 𝑡 at the ex
ante stage, where 𝜂1 + 𝜂2 = 𝜂. We assume that the marginal profit
an implementer gets from 𝑡 is a strictly increasing function of 𝜂𝑡 ,
which we denote 𝑣𝑡 (𝜂𝑡 ). This reflects the network value of
interoperability. To isolate focus to these network effects, assume
for simplicity there are no fixed costs associated with either
technology (𝐾𝑡 = 0, each 𝑡).
The implementers coordinate the choice of technologies
through a standard-setting organization to ensure that, whatever
their choice, they will enjoy the full network value. That is, they
195. See, e.g., Farrell et al., supra note 21, at 603 (discussing holdup risks).
196. For example, it could be also be that sunk costs tend to be larger in this
context. Such possibilities are similarly easy to express using our model.
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ensure that 𝜂𝑡 ∗ = 𝜂 for some selection 𝑡 ∗ . As such, at the ex ante
stage, the firms compare 𝜋1 = 𝑣1 (𝜂) to 𝜋2 = 𝑣2 (𝜂). Assume this is
larger for technology 1. Then, if an implementer switches
unilaterally to technology 2 ex post, it anticipates earning a profit
of 𝜋2|1 = 𝑣2 (0).
Hence, if the patentee asserts its rights against an individual
implementer, the holdup rents are ℋ = 𝒩2 , where 𝒩2 ≡ 𝑣2 (𝜂) −
𝑣2 (0) is the forgone network value of technology 2. This is the
opportunity cost of adopting technology 2 ex post rather than ex
ante. While it may be intuitive to think that holdup serves to
extract the network value of the adopted standard—technology
1—that is not the case. It is not the forgone network value
associated with technology 1 that constitutes the holdup rents, but
rather the forgone network value associated with not having
selected technology 2 ex ante.
Uncertainty
Now we extend the model to account for patent uncertainty,
and for bargaining in the shadow of litigation. Let 𝜃 (0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1)
denote the probability that the patent would be held valid and
infringed by the implementer’s use of technology 1. (For
expositional simplicity, we will just refer to “validity” and not
“validity and infringement.”) We now let ℱ𝜃𝐴 denote the maximal
fee negotiated ex ante, conditional on 𝜃, and similarly for ℱ𝜃𝑃 . Note
that the term 𝑐𝐹 𝐴 defined previously can be expressed as ℱ1𝐴, since
we assumed away patent uncertainty. Note further that the fee
will be zero if the patent is known to be invalid with certainty
(ℱ0𝐴 = 0). As Lemley and Shapiro note (in a similar framework),197
when we allow for any probability 𝜃, an intuitive benchmark for
the maximal ex ante fee is

ℱ𝜃∗ = 𝜃ℱ1𝐴 + (1 − 𝜃)ℱ0𝐴

197. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 2001 (discussing benchmarks
for reasonable royalties).
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= 𝜃ℱ1𝐴
This is the expected value of the maximal fee that would be
charged if the patent’s validity were somehow revealed ex ante.
Now suppose that, at the ex ante stage, the parties bargain in the
shadow of litigation. We assume litigation costs are zero for
simplicity. If the patentee wins, the court will issue a remedy
whose monetary value is 𝑅. This is either a damages award or the
forgone profits if an injunction is issued and enforced (forcing the
implementer to switch to the alternative). We interpret a value 𝑅 >
ℱ1∗ as excessive, since the remedy is more costly than the largest
amount the implementer would pay conditional on knowing the
patent is valid and infringed. If firm 1 adopts technology 1 ex ante
and the parties litigate, then the implementer’s expected total
profits are

𝜃(𝜋1 − 𝐾1 − 𝑅) + (1 − 𝜃)(𝜋1 − 𝐾1 ) = 𝜋1 − 𝐾1 − 𝜃𝑅
Then, if ex ante negotiations break down, the implementer will
either adopt the alternative, or else risk litigation. In particular, it
will adopt the alternative if and only if 𝜋2 − 𝑘2 > 𝜋1 − 𝑘1 − 𝜃𝑅. Note
that if the implementer prefers risking litigation to adopting the
alternative, then the maximal ex ante fee is 𝜃𝑅. Otherwise the fee
is 𝜋1 − 𝑘1 − (𝜋2 − 𝑘2 ) = ℱ1𝐴 . This means that the maximal ex ante
fee becomes

ℱ𝜃𝐴 = min {ℱ1𝐴 , 𝜃𝑅}
The top and bottom cases refer to adoption of the alternative
and deliberate infringement, respectively. Note that this implies
that even ex ante fees are excessive in the sense that ℱ𝜃𝐴 > ℱ𝜃∗ ; this
occurs when remedies are excessive (𝑅 > 𝐹̧1∗ ). In this case, there is
some amount of systematic overcharging that is unrelated to
holdup. This was one of the important results in Lemley and
Shapiro.198

198.

Id. at 2003–04.
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Now consider the ex post stage, after the implementer has
committed to the patented technology. If the implementer still
decides to infringe and risk losing in court, its expected profits at
the margin will be 𝜋1 − 𝜃𝑅. But if it switches to the alternative
(thereby avoiding liability), its profits will be 𝜋2|1 − 𝑘2|1. The latter
is the more profitable option if and only if 𝜃𝑅 > ℱ1𝑃 . Thus, given
any probability 𝜃, the maximal ex post fee will be

ℱ𝜃𝑃 = {

ℱ1𝑃 , if 𝜃𝑅 > ℱ1𝑃
𝜃𝑅, otherwise.

Similar to the ex ante case, the fee is always excessive (ℱ𝜃𝑃 >
when remedies are excessive. When 𝜃𝑅 > ℱ1𝐴 , so that the
implementer prefers the alternative to deliberate infringement,
things work out just like in our simpler model. In this case, it is
easy to see that the holdup rents are ℋ = ℱ1𝑃 − ℱ1𝐴 = 𝑘1 + Δ𝑘2 +
Δ𝜋2, which is exactly the same as before (just with added
subscripts). In this case, it is still true that holdup occurs if and
only if there is path dependence. And note that, if remedies are
excessive, then there is systemic overcharge in addition to holdup.
No holdup occurs if the implementer prefers litigation to the
alternative, for in both ex ante and ex post bargaining, the fee is 𝜃.
ℱ𝜃∗ )

